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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Currently, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) occupant protection 
standards are primarily based on the Multi-Axial Dynamic Response Criteria, which NASA refers to as 
the Brinkley Dynamic Response Criterion (BDRC).  The BDRC was developed by the United States 
Air Force (USAF) and adopted by NASA in the mid-1990s during the development of the Assured 
Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) [1] and evaluation of the Soyuz three-person crew vehicle landing 
impact tests [2-6]. 
 During this period, NASA developed the X-38 vehicle that would remain docked to the 
International Space Station (ISS) to provide emergency return capability for the ISS crew.  The vehicle 
was designed to land on unprepared terrain instead of landing on the runway as with the Space Shuttle. 
 In addition, NASA contracted with NPO Energia (developers of the Soyuz spacecraft) in the 
early 1990s to modify and evaluate the Soyuz vehicle for use to transport U.S. astronauts to and from 
the ISS. 
 This BDRC eventually was incorporated into the NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-
System Standard document, which applies to all new manned vehicle programs at NASA. 
 The BDRC criterion includes a dynamic model, which is used to evaluate the risk of injury 
using a series of lumped parameter models with mass, spring, and damping properties.  The individual 
model units are arranged orthogonally to respond to linear accelerations and linear components of 
angular accelerations measured on the vehicle occupant seat.  During the BDRC development, these 
model responses were related to human injury data to develop low, medium, and high injury risk 
limits.  Because of the simplicity of the BDRC, it is very attractive to designers, as it is very simple to 
evaluate for many design cases with only seat accelerations.  However, because of these 
simplifications and the specific characteristics of the seating systems used, there are application criteria 
or rules that are necessary to correctly apply the model and interpret the results.  In addition, because 
of the subjects used in the development of the BDRC and some unique considerations for NASA’s 
applications, several limitations have been identified that limit the injury prediction capabilities of the 
model. 
 The purpose of this document is to review the BDRC development, document the rules 
necessary to apply the BDRC, identify limitations for NASA’s application, and describe additional 
testing and analysis methods necessary to supplement the BDRC. 
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1.0 BACKGROUND 
 The BDRC was developed as a result of an evolutionary process to define the human dynamic 
response (DR) to, and exposure limits for, short-duration accelerations (i.e., ≤500 ms) associated with 
spacecraft landing and emergency escape system performance.  The initial database that was used to 
associate injury risk to short-duration acceleration exposures was developed in the mid to late 1940s and 
early 1950s by the USAF research authorities such as Stapp and his contemporaries [7-10].  These data 
were used in the guidance and standards for design, development, and performance evaluation of aircraft 
emergency ejection seats.  Accelerations during ejection seat and occupant catapulting from an aircraft 
cockpit and their aerodynamic deceleration were controlled by use of limits defined in terms of 
acceleration amplitude, rate of acceleration onset, and duration presuming a trapezoidal waveform [11, 
12].  Injury risks were defined in terms of areas of voluntary tolerance, medium injury, and severe 
injury.  This approach worked well for open ejection seat design as the acceleration-time profiles could 
be easily controlled by those limited parameters. 
 In the mid 1950s to early 1960s, escape systems designers developed aircraft enclosed escape 
systems to provide very high-speed escape and high-altitude protection capabilities such as those 
provided by the B-58 capsule, the XB-70 capsule, and the F/FB-111 crew escape cockpit.  These aircraft 
escape systems were each designed to land with the occupants on the Earth’s terrain or water. The 
landing impact profiles did not meet the acceleration limit criteria due to the high rates of acceleration 
onsets and multi-directional nature of the landing impacts. 
 In the late 1950s, the USAF and NASA undertook the design of manned spacecraft.  USAF 
programs included Dyna-Soar and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (1958 to 1967) and NASA 
successfully developed the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo space flight programs [13].  The initial 
acceleration limits were established [11, 12] in terms of rate of onset, acceleration amplitude, and 
duration for acceleration profiles known to be within voluntary tolerance and those known to cause 
medium to severe injury.  However, the fitting of the trapezoidal acceleration-time histories was 
inadequate to assess the injury risk due to the complex multi-directional landing impact acceleration-
time histories associated with these crew systems. 
 These systems shared a common design constraint; they were limited in terms of the distance 
available for deceleration of the vehicles during landing.  For example, the B-58 capsule landed on the 
seatback bulkhead with only inches available for the stroke of its four metal cutting impact attenuation 
devices [14].  The Mercury capsule would normally land on water using an airbag skirt around its heat 
shield to attenuate impact under normal recovery conditions.  However, if the capsule was to be safely 
lifted away from the main launch rocket during an emergency abort on the launch pad, the skirt could 
not be deployed and inflated quickly enough to protect the capsule occupant during land or water 
landing.  Only a small column of crushable aluminum honeycomb under the astronaut’s seatback would 
be available to attenuate the landing impact. 
 In contrast, ejection seats could be accelerated over a distance of about 3 feet by its ejection 
catapult, thereby permitting a more gradual rate of acceleration onset to meet the relatively low rate of 
onset limits enforced at that time by the USAF and Navy. 
 As a result of this problem, the USAF began experimental studies to investigate the effects of 
rapid rate of onset accelerations that would occur during escape capsule landings.  The studies were also 
designed to investigate how the human body responded as a mechanical system to extremely high rate of 
acceleration onset in the range of thousands of G/s [15].  Due to the parallel investigations and 
development of spacecraft by the USAF and NASA, this line of investigation was tackled jointly, both 
experimentally [16-19] and analytically, using existing empirical data and a mechanical dynamic 
systems approach [20-23]. 
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 Examples of other key experimental research results include that of Beeding and Mosely [24, 25] 
who conducted experiments using a horizontal deceleration facility to study the responses of volunteers 
to impact in forward-facing and rearward-facing seats as well as off-axis conditions [25] with lap belt 
and shoulder harness restraints.  They reported severe shock and repeated syncope with myalgia 
requiring one volunteer to be hospitalized for 5 days following his exposure to a 40-G sled deceleration 
with a rate of onset of 2,139 G/s and a velocity change of 48.5 ft/s in a rear-facing seat.  Mosley reported 
that the subject may not have survived without immediate medical care.  Prior exposures of volunteers in 
this position ranged from 25 to 40 G at onset rates from 1,034 to 2,139 G/s for durations of 50 to 190 
ms.  Impact velocities were below 50 ft/s.  The acceleration-time histories could be defined in terms of 
the existing trapezoidal acceleration-time profile, although a half-sine pulse shape more approximated 
the applied acceleration. 
 The experimental efforts were soon expanded to investigate the effects of multidirectional 
accelerations necessary to support the development of the Apollo crew module.  The initial 
multidirectional impact studies were conducted with volunteer military subjects using a vertical 
deceleration tower to demonstrate the safety of impact conditions expected during the Apollo crew 
module landings [26].  These were the first controlled multidirectional impact experiments to study the 
human response to impact directions other than impacts in the X axis and Z axis.  Special concern was 
focused upon the responses of the volunteers to sideward acceleration since the Apollo impact 
attenuation system was limited to a stoke distance of less than 8 inches in that direction.  Prior to this 
research, volunteers had not been exposed to sideward impact.  Impact levels were gradually raised by 
increments of direction and impact level until the NASA goals of impact level were reached.  
Acceleration levels ranged from 3 to 26.6 G with rates of onset ranging from 300 to 2000 G/s and impact 
velocities up to 28 ft/s. 
 U.S. Navy researchers conducted impact tests with volunteers using a horizontal track at a Naval 
facility in Philadelphia to provide the initial investigations of the effects of impacts in the -Z axis to 
support the Apollo program [27]. 
 The USAF experimental research was expanded using the horizontal deceleration facilities at 
Holloman Air Force Base (AFB) [28-30] to partially replicate the work of Weis et al. and to increase the 
investigation to include tests conducted including -Z axis components that were not considered feasible 
using the vertical deceleration facility at Wright-Patterson AFB.  More than 500 tests were performed at 
Wright-Patterson AFB and Holloman AFB to support the objectives of these multidirectional impact 
investigations. 
 Later impact tests were conducted at Holloman AFB with volunteers to study the influence of 
developmental seats, restraints, and pressure suits, as shown in Figures 1 and 2.  Complete test plans, 
medical protocols, test data recordings, and photogrammetric records of these tests have not been 
located. 
 During these later impact tests of full pressure suit prototypes, one of two subjects exposed to +Z 
axis impact conditions incurred a seventh thoracic vertebra fracture as a result of the tests being 
conducted with the pressure suit partly inflated [31].  The details of these tests remain unknown. 
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Figure 1.  Volunteers undergoing an impact test in developmental pressure suits, lap belts, 
shoulder harness, and seating system.  (Credit: USAF) 
 
Figure 2.  A volunteer being tested in a developmental pressure suit using a lap belt, shoulder 
straps, and inverted-V, negative-G straps.  (Credit: USAF) 
 Payne [22] further developed numerical models of human body dynamics and studied the effects 
of body support and restraint systems in a research effort jointly funded by the USAF and NASA.  
Important analytical results influencing the design of restraint systems included studies of the influence 
of restraint system slackness and preload using lumped-parameter models of human dynamic impact 
response. 
 The results of the hundreds of impact tests with volunteer subjects and of the analytical modeling 
efforts were used to support the design and development the Apollo crew module and its occupant 
protection system.  The module successfully recovered each crew without injuries after every landing 
impact throughout the entire Apollo program.  The final design of the body support and restraint system 
used in the Apollo crew module was simpler that the body support system initially used in the 
multidirectional impact research experiments with volunteers.  More details of these research efforts are 
provided in Appendix A. 
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1.1 FOCUS ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION OF A SPINAL INJURY MODEL 
 Payne had suggested that two lumped parameter models could be used to describe the human 
responses to spinal (+Z-axis) and transverse (X-axis) impact conditions.  NASA and the Air Force 
Research Laboratory (AFRL) sponsored a more detailed study of these models [23] using data from tests 
with human cadavers, and available impact as well as vibration tests with volunteers [32]. 
 The spinal injury model was used on an experimental basis to evaluate the performance of the 
F/B-111 crew-escape cockpit system during developmental and qualification ejections from a rocket-
propelled sled.  Using the spinal injury model referred to as the Dynamic Response Index (DRI), 
Brinkley estimated the ground landing of the F/B-111 escape system to have a probability of spinal 
injury greater than 20%.  After the system was operational, the spinal injury rate was found to be 
29.5%(23/78) by Hearon et al. [33]. 
 Brinkley [34] and colleagues [35] conducted laboratory impact studies and evaluation of the 
spinal injury rates associated with operational USAF ejection seats using the DRI model developed by 
Steck and Payne [23].  Using the operational ejection seat data, Brinkley and Shaffer [35] validated the 
model using the injury probability distribution from the work of Steck and Payne [23], but adjusting it to 
match the higher resistance to crew spinal injury shown in Figure 3 [35]. 
 
Figure 3.  Probability of spinal injury estimated from operational ejection seat experience [35]. 
 The DRI model estimates combined with ejection tests on volunteers were used to correct an 
extraordinarily high spinal injury rate associated with the ejection seat used in the F-4 aircraft.  The 
complex curvature of the seat back and headrest caused the seat occupant to be forward of the ejection 
catapult thrust vector [35, 36].  This caused the occupant’s head and upper body to flex forward and the 
lumbar spine and pelvis to rotate backward during ejection, lowering the threshold of compression injury 
to the thoracic spine and coccyx [37].  To correct the high injury rate, the ejection catapult thrust was 
reduced and a rocket was added to the seat bottom to sustain the acceleration after the seat separated 
from the aircraft.  The seat-back geometry and thrust vector alignment could not be accomplished 
without a major seat redesign or replacement (see Figure 4).  Because of the feasible changes, the spinal 
injury rate was reduced from 34% attributed to catapult force to 8% as shown in Figure 5 [35]. 
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Figure 4.  Seat-back geometry and spine alignment to the ejection thrust vector [36]. 
 
Figure 5.  The F-4 ejection seat injury rates associated with the DRI [35]. 
 The ability of the spinal column to withstand +Z-axis acceleration without injury may be 
significantly increased with proper spinal column alignment prior to impact. 
1.2 EVALUATING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF MULTI-DIRECTIONAL ACCELERATION 
CONDITIONS 
 During the 1970s, the USAF used a method to evaluate multi-directional acceleration 
environments that incorporated the DRI with a method to assess the magnitude of accelerations in the 
other principal axes that occurred within a moving 62-ms analysis window.  A computer program was 
developed to accomplish this analysis incorporating look-up tables to assess the effects of the X-, Y-, 
and -Z-axes.  While this method provided a consistent means to evaluate the performance of relatively 
conventional ejection seats, it did not provide a means to evaluate a new generation of ejection seats.  
These new ejection seat designs incorporated an array of attitude, altitude, and airspeed sensors; digital 
flight control; ejection catapult thrust control; and rocket thrust vector control.  In situations where the 
conditions at ejection were benign, the escape system performance would be controlled to produce a low 
injury risk.  Where the conditions presented a higher risk to the seat occupant, the ejection seat would 
produce accelerations with a higher injury risk, but a higher likelihood of a successful escape. 
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 This concept led the USAF to generate a strategic plan for a development program to 
demonstrate the technologies required to demonstrate an advanced ejection seat that would have such 
flight control features, and would be capable of safe escape at aircraft speeds up to 700 knots equivalent 
airspeed.  The new technologies required to evaluate the performance of such an ejection seat included a 
test manikin capable of measuring specific forces and moments at key internal locations and extremity 
joints, a rocket sled capable of providing adverse attitudes and roll motion of an aircraft forebody at the 
time of an ejection test, and a means to sense and assess the injury risk associated with the escape 
system’s performance [38]. 
2.0 BRINKLEY DYNAMIC RESPONSE CRITERION DEVELOPMENT 
 Brinkley [39] proposed a means to evaluate the performance of an escape system using a whole 
body acceleration exposure limit method.  Its primary objective was to compute a set of DRs that could 
be used to estimate the injury risk levels.  The computations would be based on measurements of linear 
acceleration and angular velocities at a known point.  Brinkley proposed that if the linear acceleration at 
a point on the seat and the angular velocity were known, then the seat motion would be uniquely defined 
and the linear acceleration at any point in the seat coordinate system could be calculated.  Brinkley 
proposed that a 6 degree-of-freedom (DOF), lumped-parameter model could be used to assess the DR of 
the human body in each orthogonal axis.  The DRs of the three orthogonal axes could be used to 
calculate a general whole body injury risk in terms of an ellipsoidal approximation.  Model parameters, 
natural frequency, and damping coefficients were selected on the basis of available laboratory data and 
existing lumped-parameter models.  Injury risk levels were chosen on the basis of operational escape 
system experience, injury-free and minimal injury military laboratory tests, research using anesthetized 
animals, experiments with post-mortem human surrogates, and accidental injuries that had occurred in 
experiments in government laboratories and during impact tests conducted by aerospace companies. 
 For each axis, two separate analyses are needed:  determining the DR parameters (natural 
frequency and damping coefficients) and determining the injury risk levels based on available injury 
data. 
2.1 LIMITATIONS 
 In general, although the model simplicity allows for straightforward injury evaluation, 
simplification of the human-vehicle interface to the acceleration input to a set of lumped-parameter 
models may not protect the occupant from a variety of injurious causes.  Because the dynamics are 
intimately related to the specific test setup used in development, extrapolation of the data to different 
configurations may necessitate additional testing with the configuration and recalculating the model 
parameters [40].  As noted, much of the injury data used to develop the injury risk limits for each axis 
have not been reported in detail.  Without exact knowledge of the conditions and configurations of these 
cases, it is unclear how robust the limits are for predicting the true risk of injury using future seat, 
restraint, pressure suit, and helmet designs. 
 Brinkley reports that the limits for ±X, ±Y, and -Z were assigned without statistically based 
methods [40].  Nevertheless, the results of the many hundreds of tests with investigators and volunteers 
willing to explore previously unexplored impact levels at high risks of injury are highly unlikely to be 
repeated in the future.  Limitations specific to each axis are further discussed below. 
2.2 -X AXIS 
2.2.1 -X Axis Dynamic Response Model Parameter Estimation 
 Initially the DRx model parameters were developed from a variety of data not specifically 
collected for that purpose from various military experiments.  The -X (eyeballs out, frontal impact) data 
consisted primarily of data with rise times between 25 to 160 ms [41].  Brinkley et al. [41], using data 
from Study 198402 in the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Collaborative Biodynamics Network 
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(CBDN) [42], recalculated the model parameters based on data from 17 male subjects all tested at 
varying rise times at 10G (Table 1) for a total of 85 runs. 
TABLE 1.  SUBJECT DATA USED TO DETERMINE -X AXIS (EYEBALLS OUT) DYNAMIC 
RESPONSE MODEL 
Subject 
Subject 
Height 
[cm] 
Subject 
Weight 
[kg] 
Subject 
Age 
Subject 
Sex 
Nominal 
G 
Rise 
Time 
[ms] 
Pulse 
Duration 
[ms] 
Number 
of Tests 
D-3 185.4 90.2 24 M 10 23-35 48-84 3 
G-4 186.9 73.0 23 M 10 17-29 30-65 3 
H-7 184.9 88.8 27 M 10 18-117 34-252 6 
H-8 178.8 66.7 28 M 10 17-34 30-83 5 
K-2 172.7 90.1 23 M 10 17-119 34-251 8 
L-3 182.4 84.8 34 M 10 18-120 34-247 8 
L-4 182.9 83.3 23 M 10 16-114 31-246 7 
M-15 166.1 63.6 25 M 10 16-112 29-246 5 
M-16 177.8 91.2 29 M 10 23-35 48-84 3 
R-6 174.9 72.6 34 M 10 14-119 30-252 5 
R-8 189.7 76.7 26 M 10 24-33 49-83 3 
S-3 176.7 75.8 35 M 10 16-119 32-247 4 
S-7 174.0 77.2 24 M 10 18-32 31-83 5 
S-8 184.7 95.2 26 M 10 18-34 31-84 4 
T-1 167.9 74.8 30 M 10 15-114 31-244 5 
T-3 170.9 74.5 22 M 10 34-113 80-245 3 
W-4 178.1 89.1 27 M 10 15-113 29-252 8 
 This new analysis estimated the natural frequency for the -X model as 56.0 rad/s versus 62.8 
rad/s in the initial model.  The damping coefficient estimate was significantly different (0.04 versus 0.2 
in the initial model).  Brinkley et al. suggested that the original computations be recomputed. 
2.2.2 -X Axis Injury Risk Level Determination 
 The high risk level (5% - 50%) limits are based on volunteer data collected on the rocket 
propelled sled at Muroc Lake, CA (now Edwards AFB) [7, 8], the Daisy Decelerator Track [7, 8, 24, 25] 
at Holloman AFB, NM, and multi-axis testing conducted at the Wright-Patterson AFB and Holloman 
AFB [26, 28, 29].  The computed DR data are shown in Figure 6.  Additional information about these 
studies can be found in Appendix A.  Injuries for the -X axis for the high risk level include 
cardiovascular shock, retinal hemorrhage, and fracture of the subject's neck-hyoid bone and severe 
cardiovascular shock requiring hospitalization [43]. 
 The low risk (<0.5%) limits are based on acceleration levels routinely tolerated by volunteers in 
laboratory experiments.  High impact volunteer testing has been conducted with volunteers up to 40 G in 
the -X axis with robust restraints including shoulder straps, a lap belt, and two crotch straps attached 
from the lap belt buckle to each corner of the seat reference line of the seat pan [43].  Note that during 
the rocket sled tests, the subject’s head and neck were flexed forward due to pre-impact rocket sled 
deceleration.  Injuries that occurred were not considered to be major by medical investigators such as 
Stapp [7].  However, the helmets that were used were lighter than pressure suit helmets that may be used 
by astronauts.  The heavier helmets may increase the risk of injuries in case of significant -X axis 
impacts. 
 The medium injury risk (0.5% to 5%) limits were chosen as the mid-point between the low- and 
high-risk limits. 
 9 
 
Figure 6.  -X model high injury risk level determination [39].  Data points were derived from 
volunteer tests.  Injury or serious symptoms are designated by black diamonds.  Non-injury cases 
are designated by open circles.  The curve represents the high injury risk limit (estimated to 
approximate a 50% risk of injury for male subjects with conventional flight helmets and a 5-point 
restraint system). 
2.2.3 -X Axis Model Limitations 
 In addition to the limitations described in Section 2.1, there are several additional limitations 
related to these models. 
 Data were only collected at 10 G.  Although many different pulse widths were used in the 
development, it is unclear how well the model extends to other G-levels.  The rise time of the pulses 
used was varied, allowing a better estimation of the frequency response of the human, but it is unclear if 
the rate-sensitive nature of the human response is completely captured in this limited data set.  This may 
account for the differences seen between the original models and the re-analysis. 
 First, the subjects used were all male.  It is unclear how the models would change for female 
occupants.  In regard to age, the subject ages range from 22 to 35, well below the current NASA 
astronaut population range of 32 to 56.  Although the current age ranges may not be indicative of the 
flight population for a particular vehicle, historically astronauts tend to be older than military 
populations used for USAF research efforts.  For anthropometry, the subjects used to develop the -X axis 
model ranged in stature from 166 to 190 cm, whereas the NASA requirements cover a range of 149 to 
195 cm.  Although the model data do not cover the entire range, the range covered is a significant 
portion of the population.  For weight, the subjects included in the model ranged from 66.7 to 91.2 kg 
versus 42.6 to 110.2 kg in the NASA requirements. 
 In regard to the injury risk limits, as mentioned earlier, very little information is given to 
determine the adequacy of the limits chosen.  Figure 6 shows data used to develop the high (5% to 50%) 
risk limits for both the ±X models for the original model parameters. In the reanalysis, the limits weren’t 
changed and it is unclear whether the original injury cases were recalculated using the new model.  
Another concern with the injury risk limits is the difference in data sets.  The model parameters were 
selected based on one set of data, and the injury data were taken from different tests that may have had 
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differing configurations.  Again, without more information on the exact tests and setup used when injury 
occurred, it is impossible to determine the adequacy of the limits. 
2.3 +X AXIS 
2.3.1 +X Axis Dynamic Response Model Parameter Estimation 
 Initially the DRx model parameters were developed from a variety of data not specifically 
collected for that purpose from various military experiments.  The +X (eyeballs in, rear impact) data 
consisted primarily of rise times between 20 to 50 ms, with only a few cases between 80 to 100 ms. 
 Brinkley [39] reports both a -X and +X model. Because the +X data were insufficient to 
adequately estimate model parameters, the -X model fit the data reasonably well to allow the same 
model to be applied to both X directions.  Since then, experimental human response data became 
available in the -X axis, and the coefficients in that direction were changed to reflect the new data (see 
section 2.2).  It's uncertain whether the +X coefficients were intended to be revised as well, thus the 
previous model parameters will be used [44].  The natural frequency was previously estimated as 62.8 
rad/s and the damping coefficient as 0.2.  No additional information is available related to the 
development of this model, nor is there information about what +X data were used to determine the fit 
was adequate. 
2.3.2 +X Axis Injury Risk Level Determination 
 The high risk level (5% to 50%) limits are based on volunteer data collected on the rocket 
propelled sled at Muroc Lake, CA (now Edwards AFB) [7, 8], the Daisy Decelerator Track [7, 8, 24, 25] 
at Holloman AFB, NM, and multi-axis testing conducted at the Wright-Patterson AFB and Holloman 
AFB [26, 28, 29].  The computed DR data are shown in Figure 7.  Additional information about these 
studies can be found in Appendix A.  The low risk (<0.5%) limits are based on acceleration levels 
routinely tolerated by volunteers in laboratory experiments.  The medium risk (0.5% to 5%) limits were 
chosen as the mid-point between the low- and high-risk limits. 
  
 11 
 
Figure 7.  +X model high injury risk level determination [39].  Data points were derived from 
volunteer tests. Injury or serious symptoms are designated by black diamonds.  Non-injury or 
minor injury cases are designated by open circles.  The line represents the high injury risk limit 
(estimated to be a 50% risk of injury) 
2.3.3 +X Axis Model Limitations 
 For the +X model, very limited data were used in the initial model showing the ±X models were 
similar.  Since then, no additional analysis of the +X model dynamics has been performed to validate 
this assumption.  Because +X axis loading is one of the primary loading directions expected in 
spacecraft landings, this uncertainty in the validity of this +X model is concerning.  Data are available to 
develop an updated model, but the work was not completed due to funding changes. 
 The subject demographics are another limitation.  Because the previous model’s demographics 
were not stated, it is unclear how the subject demographics compare to the astronaut population. 
2.4 ±Y AXIS 
2.4.1 Y Axis Dynamic Response Model Parameter Estimation 
 Selection of model parameters for the Y axis proved to be the most difficult due to the limited 
data.  One set of sideward impact data was selected to be suitable for analysis [45].  Using data collected 
from 13 subjects at 8 G (a total of 15 runs) from Study 197901 [42] (Table 2), the natural frequency was 
estimated as 58.0 (±1.7 SD) rad/s and the damping coefficient was estimated as 0.07 (±0.04 SD). 
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TABLE 2.  SUBJECT DATA USED TO DETERMINE Y AXIS DYNAMIC RESPONSE MODEL 
Subject 
Subject 
Height 
[cm] 
Subject 
Weight 
[kg] 
Subject 
Age 
Subject 
Sex 
Nominal 
G 
Rise 
Time 
[ms] 
Pulse 
Duration 
[ms] 
Number 
of Tests 
D-1 186.9 90.9 23 M 8 100 204 1 
E-1b 185.4 84.5 39 M 8 98 194 1 
F-2 170.2 71.4 24 M 8 99 207 1 
F-3 174.0 70.9 24 M 8 95 212 2 
G-2 160.0 54.5 22 F 8 99 199 1 
J-1b 179.1 72.7 25 M 8 99 218 1 
M-10 167.0 63.6 22 M 8 101 213 1 
M-5 183.9 76.8 34 M 8 97 211 1 
M-9 180.1 76.8 25 M 8 96 212 1 
R-1 180.1 91.4 34 M 8 94 213 2 
S-3 176.8 74.1 30 M 8 100 221 1 
S-5 178.0 78.6 27 F 8 98 221 1 
W-1 186.9 70.5 22 M 8 100 218 1 
2.4.2 Y Axis Injury Risk Level Determination 
 Injury risk levels could not be developed with high confidence as few injuries had been observed 
beyond adverse cardiovascular responses [26, 28-30] knee injury [45], bradycardia, and syncope [30].  
The injury risk levels (including data with side panels) were determined based on expert opinion and 
available data [26, 28, 30, 45].  Additional information about these studies can be found in Appendix A.  
Data from a larger number of Y axis impact tests with volunteers conducted at AFRL were analyzed to 
study the loads measured on rigid shoulder support panels and related those dynamic impact responses to 
the probability of clavicle fractures and shoulder joint injuries from in NASCAR crashes.  This work 
was also not completed due to funding constraints. 
 The high risk (5% to 50%) injury level was determined by determining the DR for known 
injurious acceleration conditions.  Injurious conditions were adverse cardiovascular responses due to 
stretching the receptors within the carotid arteries of the neck.  When side supports are used, there have 
been minor but adverse cardiovascular responses at high impact levels.  At higher levels expected 
injuries would include fractures within the cervical spine and rupture of the aorta; however, these 
injuries were fortunately not observed in testing. 
 The low risk (<0.5%) level was determined from human tolerance based on numerous non-
injurious volunteer tests.  
 The medium risk (0.5% to 5%) level was assigned as a mid-point between the low and high-risk 
levels. 
2.4.3 Y Axis Model Limitations 
 As with the ±X model, the ±Y model is based on a limited data set.  The model relies on data 
collected on a very limited number of subjects and test runs.  The model is based on 15 cases tested at 
only 1 G-level and rise-time.  Applicability beyond this dynamic condition is not known. 
 Subject demographics for this model have some limitations.  It is encouraging that 2 females 
were included in the ±Y model, but is not a sufficient number to account for sex differences.  As for 
anthropometry, the range of subject stature was 160 to 189 cm compared to the NASA requirements 
range of 149 to 195 cm.  Although the model data do not cover the entire range, the range covered is a 
significant portion of the population.  For weight, the subjects included in the model ranged from 54.5 to 
91.4 kg versus 42.6 to 110.2 kg in the NASA requirements.  The subject ages ranged from 22 to 34, 
which is well below the current NASA astronaut population range of 32 to 56.  It is not known if age, 
gender, and anthropometry are factors for lateral impact tolerance. 
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 Although the test cases were conducted without side supports, it is assumed that the model 
parameters are the same for these two conditions; however, there are no data supporting this assumption.  
The damping coefficient in the model is lower due to the poorer coupling with the restraints, so it would 
be expected that better restrained occupants (with side supports) would have a higher damping 
coefficient, resulting in an underestimation of the human response. 
 Injury limits are reported for conditions with and without side supports with very little 
explanation of the source of the side-supported limits.  As with the ±X case, the data used to determine 
the injury limits were from different cases than those used to develop the dynamic model and it is 
unclear what configuration was used to collect those data.  It is also unclear what data were used (if any) 
to develop the limits.  In regards to the case where side supports are not included, Brinkley has stated 
that the injury risk limits are not appropriate and are insufficient to mitigate injury [32] 
2.5 +Z AXIS (EYEBALLS DOWN) 
2.5.1 +Z Axis Dynamic Response Model Parameter Estimation 
 The +Z axis DRI is the most validated axis of the model, and was adopted for use in the BDRC 
[23, 34, 35].  The damping coefficient was estimated from 8 male subjects shown in Table 3 [46]. 
 The natural frequency determination in the +Z axis, however, is a bit more complicated.  Yorra 
[47] determined the load deflection curves for the fourth lumbar vertebrae (L4 spine level) on a 57.5-
year-old cadaver, whereas Ruff [48] measured vertebral breaking strength in cadavers (19 to 46 years 
old) for various lower vertebrae between the thoracic spinal bodies at T8 and L5.  Stech and Payne 
assumed a linear relationship between breaking strength and stiffness [23].  Based on this assumption, 
Stech and Payne extrapolated the stiffness characteristics of the remaining vertebrae using the 
percentage of body weight carried by each vertebrae related to the breaking strength reported by Ruff.  
The results were extrapolated to account for age differences based on experiments of additional 
cadaveric specimens [49].  From these data, the natural frequency is determined for a variety of ages. 
TABLE 3.  SUBJECT DATA USED TO DETERMINE +Z AXIS DAMPING COEFFICIENT 
Subject 
Subject 
Height 
[cm] 
Subject 
Weight 
[kg] 
Subject 
Age 
Subject 
Sex 
W.B. 182.9 89.8 34 M 
R.C. 188.0 83.9 47 M 
B.D. 193.0 99.3 30 M 
W.E. 175.3 70.3 29 M 
W.G. 180.3 81.6 40 M 
R.H. 180.3 90.7 35 M 
E.M. 182.9 94.3 29 M 
G.Z. 170.2 71.7 29 M 
 Recently, Buhrman and Mosher reported +Z axis model parameters based on tests conducted on 
14 males and 12 females [50].  Male subject mass range was 64.8 to 103.4 kg (83.5-kg average) and 
sitting height range of 84.3 to 97.5 cm (93-cm average).  Female subject mass range was 45.4 to 70.3 kg 
(57.6-kg average) and sitting height range of 81.2 to 89.4 cm (87.1-cm average).  A total of 157 test runs 
were available, but the number used is not reported (at least 52 tests).  See Table 4 for subject 
demographics (determined from the CBDN) [42].  The model parameters estimated from the +Z-axis 
chest acceleration data are similar the parameters reported by Stech and Payne (Table 5).  The damping 
coefficients are somewhat lower, probably due the location of the measurement with respect to the spine. 
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TABLE 4.  BUHRMAN AND MOSHER SUBJECTS 
Subject 
Subject 
Height 
[cm] 
Subject 
Weight 
[kg] 
Subject 
Age 
Subject 
Sex 
Nominal 
G 
Rise 
Time 
[ms] 
Pulse 
Duration 
[ms] 
Number 
of Tests 
B-16a 165.8 57.9 31 F 10 75 150 2-6 
B-17 170.2 60.9 26 F 10 75 150 2-7 
B-18 163.8 45.6 24 F 10 75 150 2-5 
C-15 161.4 57.8 25 F 10 75 150 2-3 
C-16 158.3 54.4 21 F 10 75 150 2-1 
J-11 166.9 69.9 22 F 10 75 150 2-6 
J-9 155.5 58.3 25 F 10 75 150 2-6 
K-9 167.3 62.6 28 F 10 75 150 2-6 
O-5 166.5 63.5 24 F 10 75 150 2-6 
R-20 161.5 49.9 26 F 10 75 150 2-7 
S-20 171.2 56.8 27 F 10 75 150 2-7 
V-3 162.2 52.7 26 F 10 75 150 2-7 
B-11 184.7 104.0 35 M 10 75 150 2-6 
C-12a 172.9 83.2 35 M 10 75 150 2-6 
C-17a 177.2 72.6 29 M 10 75 150 2-6 
E-4 181.6 96.6 35 M 10 75 150 2-7 
G-11 176.6 78.1 29 M 10 75 150 2-7 
H-15 175.7 79.8 24 M 10 75 150 2-6 
J-10 175.4 88.1 23 M 10 75 150 2-7 
J-7 171.9 74.1 28 M 10 75 150 2-6 
M-21b 167.4 68.4 37 M 10 75 150 2-7 
M-30 177.9 81.3 35 M 10 75 150 2-6 
O-3 158.9 65.6 27 M 10 75 150 2-6 
P-11 188.0 84.4 25 M 10 75 150 2-6 
R-21 181.1 101.8 35 M 10 75 150 2-7 
S-11b 180.8 94.9 32 M 10 75 150 2-7 
TABLE 5.  BUHRMAN AND MOSHER MODEL PARAMETER ESTIMATES 
 Males Females Stech & Payne 
𝝎𝝎𝒏𝒏 61.1 ± 5.78 63.2 ± 6.3 52.9 
δ 0.11 ± 0.15 0.04 ± 0.07 0.224 
2.5.2 +Z Axis Injury Risk Level Determination 
 To determine the injury risk associated with +Z axis accelerations, operational ejection seat 
injury experience was related to estimated DRI values for the following aircraft: F-100 (with and without 
a rocket catapult), F-105 (with and without a rocket catapult), B-47 and B-52. Each data point represents 
the injury rate associated with at least 25 successful nonfatal ejections (Figure 8) [34].  The DRI values 
were estimated from representative catapult qualification test performance at 70°F (nominal operating 
temperature) with a 50th percentile male with personnel equipment.  Once the DRI was estimated for 
each ejection seat, the results were related to the operational occurrence of thoracolumbar spinal injuries 
and the resulting injury risk is given by Equation 1.  The injury occurrence rates are derived from fit, 
military male pilots.  The average age of the flying population at the time was 28 years old, although it is 
not known the ages of the injured pilots.  Only compression fractures (AIS≥2) attributable to the ejection 
acceleration were considered [34, 35]. 
Equation 1.  Risk of Thoracolumbar Spinal Injury 
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑧𝑧) =  10�𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑧𝑧−15.83.73 � 
 15 
 
Figure 8.  Risk of thoracolumbar spinal injuries.  The symbols denote the operational injury rate 
for various aircraft ejection seats.  The solid line denotes the injury risk based on laboratory data 
and the dashed line is the risk of injury based on operational data [35]. 
2.5.3 +Z Axis Model Limitations 
 The model used for the +Z direction is based on a very limited number of subjects and cadaveric 
studies.  The natural frequency was determined from a single 57.5-year-old cadaver and natural 
frequency was determined from a small set of male subjects.  A recent study using chest acceleration 
data showed that the damping coefficient may be slightly overestimated and the natural frequency 
slightly underestimated [50].  The study found little difference between males and females for the model 
parameters; however, Buhrman and Mosher propose that the injury limits may differ for males and 
females due to differences in vertebral stresses. 
 Injuries for the +Z axis are compression fractures of the vertebrae within the lumbar and thoracic 
spine.  The +Z axis model does not consider injuries to other regions of the body, particularly the neck; 
although no injuries to the neck were attributed to operational ejection catapult force.  For injuries to the 
lower spine, the injury risk is well validated through operational data; however, the risk is based on 
male, military subjects with an average age of 28, which may not be indicative of the NASA astronaut 
population. 
2.6 -Z AXIS (EYEBALLS UP) 
2.6.1 -Z Axis Dynamic Response Model Parameter Estimation 
 Initially, data from Schulman et al. [27] were used to estimate the model parameters.  The natural 
frequency was found to be slightly lower than the +Z model and the damping coefficient was nearly 
identical.  Because of the similarity, the +Z axis model parameters were adopted for both Z axis 
directions. 
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 Later, Brinkley et al. [41] recomputed the -Z axis model using data from Study 198504 in the 
CBDN [42].  These data consisted of 12 subjects (11 male and 1 female) tested at 10 G and various rise 
times (a total of 52 runs).  These data were used to estimate the natural frequency of 47.1 rad/s (versus 
52.9 rad/s in the initial model) and a damping coefficient of 0.24 (versus 0.224 in the initial model). 
TABLE 6.  SUBJECT DATA USED TO DETERMINE -Z AXIS DYNAMIC RESPONSE MODEL 
Subject 
Subject 
Height 
[cm] 
Subject 
Weight 
[kg] 
Subject 
Age 
Subject 
Sex 
Nominal 
G 
Rise Time 
[ms] 
Pulse 
Duration 
[ms] 
Number 
of Tests 
B-1 179.1 77.8 28 M 10 17-112 33-252 5 
D-5 185.4 79.5 24 M 10 18-112 34-252 5 
H-8 178.8 69.7 30 M 10 18-111 33-251 3 
L-3 182.4 85.5 36 M 10 17-120 33-252 5 
M-16 177.8 90.2 32 M 10 17-114 33-253 2 
M-19 188.5 83.8 26 M 10 17-112 33-253 5 
M-21a 167.6 56.1 27 M 10 17-114 33-253 5 
P-5 174.0 83.5 25 M 10 18-113 34-251 5 
S-3 176.8 71.5 37 M 10 23-117 65-240 3 
T-4 180.3 85.8 31 M 10 18-114 33-253 5 
Z-1 163.8 48.2 22 F 10 18-114 34-240 4 
Z-2 172.7 64.7 25 M 10 17-115 33-252 5 
2.6.2 -Z Axis Injury Risk Level Determination 
 The methodology used to develop the ±X and +Z axes models produced higher confidence than 
that produced for the -Z.  The results of -Z-axis accelerations explored by investigators such as Shaw 
[10] and Schulman et al. [27], and the USAF experience with downward ejection seats, were initially 
used to estimate the medium risk  (0.5% to 5%) level.  Schulman et al. data were also used to estimate 
the high risk (5% to 50%) level. 
 Upon estimation of the new dynamic model parameters, these limits were revised.  The low 
injury risk (<0.5%) limit was revised to a DR value of -13.4 based upon the maximum values computed 
from the experimental input acceleration conditions.  The medium injury risk limit (DR-z = -16.5) was 
calculated based on the maximum allowable acceleration condition of MIL-S-9479B, Military 
Specification Seat System, Upward Ejection, Aircraft, General Specification, [51].  The high injury risk 
limit (DR-z = -20.5) was determined using the worst-case impact condition tested with volunteers by 
Schulman et al.  Additional information about these studies can be found in Appendix A. 
2.6.3 -Z Axis Model Limitations 
 For the -Z model, several limitations exist.  In regard to the dynamics used for model parameter 
estimation, only 10 G peak acceleration pulses were used; however, a range of rise times were tested, 
with multiple runs per subject.  It is unclear how well the model extends to other G-levels because of the 
rate-sensitive nature of the human response. 
 In addition, the model is based on the responses of 11 males and 1 female, which may not 
account for a wide enough range of subject variability and sex differences.  The subject ages ranged 
from 24 to 37 years old, whereas the current astronaut age range is 32 to 56 years old.  Thus the data do 
not cover the upper range of ages seen currently in the astronaut corps and expected for future missions.  
The subject stature ranged from 164 to 189 cm, whereas the NASA requirement range is 149 to 195 cm.  
For weight, the subjects ranged from 64.7 to 90.2 kg versus 42.6 to 110.2 kg in the NASA requirements. 
 As stated above, there is very little documentation on the injuries used to calculate the high injury 
risk limits including what injuries were induced, and the conditions in each case.  The low risk (<0.5%) 
limit was reported without any explanation about it derivation.  As with each of the previous models, the 
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data used to determine the injury risk limits were different than the data used to develop the model 
parameters. 
3.0 BRINKLEY DYNAMIC RESPONSE CRITERION APPLICATION 
 Because statistical uncertainty remains for many of the BDRC axes, the probability of injury is 
provided as a relative scale as follows in Table 7. 
TABLE 7.  APPROXIMATE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH EACH BDRC CATEGORY 
Category Approximate Risk 
Low 0.5% 
Medium 5.0% 
High 50% 
The injury risk criterion (IRC), β, is calculated according to Equation 2. 
Equation 2.  Injury Risk Criterion Calculation 
𝛽𝛽(𝑡𝑡) =  ��𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡)
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
�
2 + �𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡)
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
�
2 + �𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑧𝑧(𝑡𝑡)
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Where DRx(t), DRy(t), and DRz(t) are calculated using the BDRC.  The dimensionless DR in each of 
the three axes is given by Equation 3. 
Equation 3. Dynamic Response (DR) Formulation 
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷(𝑡𝑡) =  𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛2 ∙ 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡)
𝑔𝑔
 
Where δ(t) is defined by the spring deflection of the dynamic system (consisting of the seat and the 
body) along each axis given by Equation 4. 
Equation 4.  DR Differential Equation 
?̈?𝛿(𝑡𝑡) + 2 ∙ 𝜁𝜁 ∙ 𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛 ∙ ?̇?𝛿(𝑡𝑡) + 𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛2 ∙ 𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐴𝐴(𝑡𝑡) 
Where: 
g Acceleration of gravity 
?̈?𝛿(𝑡𝑡) Occupant's acceleration in inertial frame 
?̇?𝛿(𝑡𝑡) Occupant's relative velocity with respect to the critical point shown in the seat coordinate system 
(Figure 9) 
𝛿𝛿(𝑡𝑡) Displacement of the occupant's body with respect to the critical point shown in the seat 
coordinate system in Figure 9 (A positive value represents compression of the body) 
𝜁𝜁 Damping coefficient ratio defined in Table 8 
𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛 Undamped natural frequency of the dynamic system defined in Table 8 
A(t) The measured acceleration, per axis, of the seat at the critical point shown in Figure 9.  
Because the seat axis is not an inertial frame, rotational acceleration must be considered in 
terms of the linear components of the angular motion. 
TABLE 8.  MODEL COEFFICIENTS* 
 X Y Z 
Eyeballs out Eyeballs in Eyeballs left Eyeballs right Eyeballs up Eyeballs down 
x < 0 x > 0 y < 0 y > 0 z < 0 z > 0 
𝝎𝝎𝒏𝒏
 56.0 62.8 58.0 58.0 47.1 52.9  𝜻𝜻 0.04 0.2 0.07 0.07 0.24 0.224 
*Note:  Equation 4 is nonlinear since the parameters 𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛 and  𝜁𝜁 change with the sign of the displacement, 𝛿𝛿. 
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Figure 9.  Critical point definition of a seated occupant. 
To determine the risk of injury in a particular axis, the following procedure is used with limits, DRlim, 
given in Table 9.  The appropriate risk level will be determined by the Projects and concurred by the 
Program. 
1. Determine the transient acceleration (A(t)) of the occupant at the critical point, in a body fixed 
coordinate system that is fixed to the seat and rotates along with any seat rotations, in each axes 
(X, Y, and Z).  A(t) is normally obtained by test or analysis. 
2. Solve the second order differential equation for the displacement (δ(t)) of the occupant (Equation 
4). 
3. Determine the DR(t) for each axis at time (t) (Equation 3). 
4. Determine β(t) using Equation 2. 
5. Find the maximum β(t).  This is the IRC. 
6. If the IRC is > 1.0, repeat steps 1-5 with the next highest DR limits. 
7. If IRC <1.0, then stop and this is the risk level for the applied acceleration. 
TABLE 9.  DYNAMIC RESPONSE LIMITS 
Axis Direction Low (<0.5%) Medium (0.5% to 5%) High (5% to 50%) 
X Eyeballs out -28 ≤ DRx < 0 -35 ≤ DRx < -28 -46 ≤ DRx < -35 
Eyeballs in 0 ≤ DRx < 35 35 ≤ DRx < 40 40 ≤ DRx <  46 
Y Eyeballs left -15 ≤ DRY < 0 -20 ≤ DRY < -15 -30 ≤ DRY < -20 
Eyeballs right 0 ≤ DRY < 15 15 ≤ DRY < 20 20 ≤ DRY < 30 
Z Eyeballs up -13.4 ≤ DRZ < 0 -16.5 ≤ DRZ < -13.4 -20.4 ≤ DRZ < -16.5 
Eyeballs down 0 ≤ DRZ < 15.2 15.2 ≤ DRZ < 18.0 18.0 ≤ DRZ < 22.8 
Table values were derived based on a review of the following:  AGARD CP-472, NASA-TM-2008-215198, 
NASA-TN-D-7440, and NASA-TN-D-6539. 
4.0 BRINKLEY DYNAMIC RESPONSE CRITERION HISTORICAL USAGE 
 The BDRC has been used in numerous research and development applications related to 
spaceflight.  A summary of each activity is given here. 
4.1 EVALUATION OF MERCURY CAPSULE LANDINGS 
 The BDRC was used retrospectively to investigate the risk of injury during Mercury capsule 
landings.  In actual landings, no injuries were reported; however, this analysis gives a point of 
comparison to previous experience to evaluate future risk. 
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 The BDRC was applied to drop tests with zero-horizontal velocity and zero-pitch attitude.  Cases 
with and without heat shield airbag were evaluated.  The results found a low probability of injury for 
land and water touchdowns (Table 10) [43]. 
TABLE 10.  MERCURY DROP TEST EVALUATION RESULTS 
Case Velocity BDRC 
Water impact; with skirt 9.1 m/s [30 ft/s]  0.32 low risk 
Land impact; with skirt 9.1 m/s [30 ft/s] 0.60 low risk 
Water impact; no skirt 9.1 m/s [30 ft/s] 0.55 low risk 
Land impact; no skirt 9.1 m/s [30 ft/s] 0.99 low risk 
4.2 EVALUATION OF APOLLO CAPSULE LANDINGS 
 In addition to the Mercury landing analysis, the BDRC was also used retrospectively to evaluate 
Apollo drop test data.  These test data were collected with zero-horizontal velocity and zero-pitch 
attitude as well.  The tests compared two heat-shield designs and two vertical-velocity conditions. The 
model showed low probability of injury for all test cases (Table 11) [43]. 
TABLE 11.  APOLLO DROP TEST EVALUATION RESULTS 
Case Velocity BDRC 
Rigid-shell theory impact 5.4 m/s [17.7 ft/s]  0.25 low risk 
Flexible heat shield 5.4 m/s [17.7 ft/s] 0.24 low risk 
Rigid-shell theory impact 6.8 m/s [22.2 ft/s] 0.34 low risk 
Flexible heat shield 6.8 m/s [22.2 ft/s] 0.32 low risk 
4.3 EVALUATION OF SOYUZ CAPSULE LANDINGS 
 The BDRC was used to evaluate tests of the Russian Soyuz vehicle to determine the risk of 
injury to U.S. crewmembers [2-6].  The MIR-era vehicle (Soyuz-TM) and the newly redesigned vehicle 
(Soyuz-TMA) were both evaluated using a probabilistic model.  The analysis included BDRC limits for 
deconditioned crewmembers [43]. 
5.0 BRINKLEY DYNAMIC RESPONSE CRITERION APPLICATION RULES 
 The BDRC is based on data from volunteer experiments and operational ejection seat experience.  
Because the model is based on single DOF dynamics, interactions between the occupant and the seat are 
not directly assessed; thus, operationally equivalent configurations are necessary for application of the 
model.  The application rules and standards stated here are intended to ensure that inappropriate 
extrapolation to other environments is not made.  All the stated application rules must be met to assess a 
system using the BDRC. 
5.1 TRANSIENT ACCELERATIONS 
 The BDRC has only been validated by test for up to 0.5-second epochs.  If the acceleration 
duration is longer than 0.5 seconds, the sustained acceleration limits (as defined in NASA-STD-3001, 
Volume II, Space Flight Human-System Standard Volume 2: Human Factors, Habitability and 
Environmental Health) are applicable and must be met [52]. 
5.1.1 Verification Method 
 Identify by analysis all transient accelerations during dynamic phases of flight at each occupant 
location.  All identified accelerations exceeding the sustained acceleration limits for less than 0.5 
seconds must be assessed as described in this document. 
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5.2 PROPER RESTRAINT 
5.2.1 Required Restraint 
 Crewmembers, at a minimum, must be restrained by a restraint system that includes pelvic, torso, 
and negative-G restraints.  The restraint system must provide at least a 5-point harness occupant 
restraint. Restraints must meet or exceed the requirements defined in SAE AS-8043B, Restraints 
Systems for Civil Aircraft, [53].  If other requirements conflict with the standard, the most conservative 
requirement is to be followed.  Additional guidance and best practices can be found in SFI Specification 
16.1, Driver Restraint Assemblies, [54] and MIL-S-58095A, Military Specification Seat System: Crash-
Resistant, Non-Ejection, Aircrew General Specification, [55]. 
 The volunteer tests conducted to demonstrate the safety of impact accelerations were numerous.  
They ranged from the two 3-inch shoulder straps, subaxillary cross chest strap, 3-inch lap belt, and 
inverted-V crotch straps used by Stapp [7] to the similar but narrower restraint webbing configurations 
used by Weis et al., Taylor and Stapp, and Brown et al. [26, 28, 29] to explore the safety of numerous 
impact directions without creating major injury (see Figure 10).  These restraint configurations exceed 
the capabilities of the 5-point harness that is recommended for spacecraft applications that will not 
operate above low injury risk levels.  Use of the 5-point restraint configuration may result in an 
underestimation of the injury risk for high-risk levels.  The 5-point harness was used for most of the 
more recent impact tests with volunteers where the data were used to compute DR model coefficients. 
 
Figure 10.  Seat and restraint system [29]. 
 During the experimental efforts, the restraint system was pretensioned to eliminate slack.  The 
capability of being tensioned by the crewmember (whether manual or automatic) to at least 45 N (10 lbf) 
per strap is required to apply the BDRC in all directions.  Payne [22] notes that “a slack of only half an 
inch in the spinal mode would increase the DRI of a continuous 20-G acceleration pulse (with zero rise 
time) by as much as 100%.”  Such a pulse is used for analytical purposes, but is not feasible using any 
impact test facility.  However, Payne also notes that additional preloading, beyond that required to 
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eliminate restraint slack, is of little value.  A value of 45 N (10 lbf) was chosen to ensure elimination of 
slack. 
 Positioning of the restraint system with respect to the body is of critical importance.  Incorrect 
placement of restraints has been shown to dramatically increase injury risk and is not reflected in the 
BDRC [56, 57].  Verification must demonstrate proper belt positioning for the smallest and largest 
occupant sizes as shown in Figure 11. 
5.2.2 Pelvic Restraints 
 Proper restraint of the pelvis is necessary for protection of the crew.  Because the pelvis provides 
a large contact area on bony structures, it is an ideal location for restraints; however, improper placement 
can cause injury to the abdomen [56, 57].  Because of this injury risk, lap belts must ride within the 
curvature of the pelvic bone preferably just below the iliac crest.  The harness buckle must be centered 
on the body 25 to 50 mm (1 to 2 inches) below the belly button when all belts are tensioned [58].  As 
shown in Figure 11 in blue, belt anchors must be located laterally within 25 mm (1 inch) of the outside 
of the thigh for all occupant sizes with the suit [59].  This assists in controlling pelvis motion during 
lateral accelerations. In addition, the belt angle must be between 45° to 55° from horizontal [60]. 
5.2.3 Torso Restraints 
 Control of the torso not only protects the ribs and internal organs, but also protects the spine from 
induced forces and moments [61]. 
 As shown in Figure 11 in black, the shoulder belts are ideally positioned across the 
trapezius/clavicle, running orthogonal to the seatback across the top of the shoulder.  If necessary (but 
not ideal) the belt may run at an upward angle of up to 30° above this point; however, in no 
circumstances should the shoulder belt run downward.  Ideally, shoulder belt must fall between the mid-
clavicular line and the acromion for all occupant sizes with the suit [59].  Critical anthropometric ranges 
for crewmembers in unpressurized suits are given in Table F1.0-2 in the Human-System Integration 
Requirements (HSIR) document [62]. 
5.2.4 Negative-G Restraints 
 In addition to pelvic and torso restraints, a negative-G restraint is required.  The negative-G strap 
provides two critical functions.  First, by tethering the negative-G strap to the forward part of the seat, it 
prevents the lap belt from moving up and over the anterior superior iliac spines of the pelvis, pressing 
into the abdomen to cause serious internal injuries [63].  Complete transection of the rectus abdominal 
muscles and hepatic lacerations have occurred in anesthetized baboon subjects as a result of submarining 
during high -Z-axis impacts [64].  Stapp [7] also reported that “the forward motion of the shoulders 
during impact applies traction to the shoulder straps, raising the lap belt, permitting the lower half of the 
body to begin bending around it.  The upper edge of the belt lodges against the lower margin of the ribs 
and against the upper abdomen.”  Second, the negative-G strap prevents the pelvis from moving upward 
during -Z-axis acceleration.  Schall [65] reported that a USAF RF-4 aircraft pilot suffered a cervical 
vertebrae fracture and transient paralysis as a result of -Z-axis aircraft acceleration causing canopy 
contact and cervical flexion during a subsequent +Z-axis acceleration. 
 To function correctly, the belt must exit at an angle in line with the chest to 20° (forward) as 
shown in red in Figure 11 [58].  Depending on the dynamics of the expected impacts, additional anti-
submarining belts (so called 7-point harness) may also be appropriate. 
5.2.5 Verification Method 
 Verify that each is true for the system: 
1. Verify restraints are equivalent to 5-point harness or better and adjustable to allow for proper 
body positioning for minimum and maximum applicable subject anthropometric ranges. 
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2. Verify by inspection or analysis that belt positioning meets above specifications for minimum 
and maximum applicable subject anthropometric ranges for the specified critical 
anthropometric dimensions. 
3. Verify by demonstration or test restraint pretensioning to a minimum of 45 N (10 lbf) can be 
accomplished by the minimum and maximum sized suited crewmembers. 
4. Verify restraint meets SAE AS-8043B. 
 
Figure 11.  Restraint configuration.  Torso restraints are shown in black, pelvis restraints are 
shown in blue, and the negative-G restraint is shown in red. 
5.3 FLAIL CONSIDERATIONS 
 During dynamic flight phases there is potential for extremity flail injury, which includes 
crewmember extremities impacting vehicular surfaces or objects, hyper-extending, hyper-flexing, hyper-
rotating, fracturing, or dislocating without proper design consideration.  Features such as harnesses, 
form-fitting seats, hand holds, foot holds, and tethers may help maintain the proper position of the 
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crewmember's body and limbs to reduce movement or contact with vehicle surfaces that would produce 
flail injury.  In addition, the design of the suit may contribute to reducing flail injury to the crew.  
Preventing the inadvertent contact of extremities with vehicular structure or interior components will 
significantly reduce the likelihood of limb fracture or soft tissue injury during a dynamic flight event.  
Extremity guards, tethers, garters, and hand holds have been used to reduce extremity flail in other 
spacecraft, aircraft, and automotive vehicles.  Limiting limb motion to within the seat envelop reduces 
the likelihood of hyperextending, hyperflexing, and hyperrotating the limbs.  Limiting and preventing 
contact with surrounding structure reduces the likelihood of blunt trauma injuries to the limbs. 
5.3.1 Verification Methodology 
 Verify by analysis and test that flail doesn’t occur per Section 7.4. 
5.4 SEATING SUPPORT 
 The testing used to develop the BDRC includes a supportive seat.  Similar seating must be used 
for the BDRC to be applicable. 
 Alignment of the spine within 5° of the Z-axis acceleration vector is desired to minimize the risk 
of injury to the spinal column.  This spinal alignment condition is important, since having the head bent 
forward during Z axis (eyeballs down) dynamics can induce thoracic spinal injury not predicted by the 
model [36].  To achieve this spinal alignment, the back of the head should not project forward more than 
5° from the plane of seatback.  Offsets caused by suit elements, the helmet, and headrest should be 
accounted for in this angle.  The head offset should not be less than 0° from the plane of the seatback 
(neck in extension).  These design recommendations will improve the safety of the design and reduce 
bending moments in the neck (see Section 7.2.2). 
 The seat back and seat pan must support the entire posterior surface of the body without gaps.  
Any gaps can contribute to amplification of the dynamics (see Section 5.5), which may lead to higher 
probabilities of occupant injuries.  For lateral seating surfaces, care must be taken to minimize gaps 
between the seat and occupant.  Gaps up to 25 mm are allowed laterally, but are not recommended. 
 In addition, a seat pan to seatback angle of >90° may cause pelvic submarining increasing the 
risk of injury.  Both angles must be ≤90° as shown in Figure 11. 
 A seat reclined at the same angle to 2° forward with respect to the impact vector would have no 
effect on injury risk, a seat reclined 20° with respect to the impact vector decreases risk of spinal/neck 
injury by 5% to 10%, and the seat back perpendicular to the impact vector (crewmember in recumbent 
position) substantially decreases risk of spinal/neck injury [45, 66-68]. 
 For -Z axis accelerations, the initial conditions at impact initiation must be met for the model to 
be applied.  The sustained acceleration vector must be such that the occupant is in contact with seating 
surfaces, and not supported primarily by the 5-point restraint.  In the original testing conducted by 
Schulman, et al. to develop the -Z axis model, the subjects were elevated 5° from supine, thus causing 
the gravity vector to press the subject into the seatback and seatpan [27]; however, Brinkley et al. [41] 
conducted testing with the subjects completely supine, resulting in the subjects only have positive 
contact with the seatback.  In this case, the subjects used hand-holds to hold themselves into the seat 
prior to the impact, again assuring proper positioning in the seat. 
 The seating system used in the development of the ±Y DR (eyeballs left and right) had minimal 
gap between the subject and the seat support surfaces.  To apply the ±Y axis BDRC, supports are 
required to support the head, shoulder, pelvis, knee, and ankle/foot at a minimum.  Gaps between the 
occupant and side panels are allowed but recommended to be minimized as possible to prevent injury 
due to closing velocity impacts.  Figure 12 shows an example of proper side supports. 
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Figure 12.  Side Support Example 
5.4.1 Verification Method 
 Verify that each is true for the system: 
1. Verify by inspection or analysis that seat back and seat pan provide full support of the body 
surface and gaps between seat and body are minimized (less than 25 mm) for all applicable 
anthropometric sizes. 
2. Verify by inspection and/or analysis that seat pan angle relative to the seatback is ≤90°. 
3. Verify by test and/or analysis side supports arrest lateral movement beyond the plane of the 
restraint surface for the head (or helmet), shoulder, pelvis, knee, and leg. 
5.5 OCCUPANT RESPONSE AMPLIFICATION 
 Amplification of the DR is a concern, as the model was developed with rigid seat back, side 
supports, and seat pan structures and may not adequately predict injury risk for seats with insufficient 
rigidity.  To address this risk, NASA has specified a minimum modal response of 15 Hz for Orion [69].  
Thus, any vehicle design will be required to have a modal response above 15 Hz for the pallet, strut, 
seatback, and seat pan structure. 
≤25mm 
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 Seat padding or cushion design may also lead to amplification of the occupant transient 
accelerations due to dynamic overshoot effects.  Amplification of the occupant response increases the 
risk of injury, but is not reflected in the model predictions.  Cushioning that can store energy and can 
quickly restore that energy back to the occupant should be avoided.  For lateral supports, seatback and 
head rest, crushable foam or rate sensitive foam are recommended.  Amplification in +Z axis 
accelerations are of primary concern, as energy absorption is the only mitigation strategy for spinal 
injury in this axis.  In previous vehicles, rate-sensitive foam has been used and has been shown to be 
beneficial for protecting crew [70].  Perry compared the original B-2 ejection seat cushion made of a 
0.63” Confor® foam layer over a 0.375” layer of polyethylene foam to a thicker comfort cushion 
composed of a 0.5” C-45 Confor® foam in the contoured buttock contact area over a 1.0” thick layer of 
C47 Confor® foam. In addition, the cushion included a raised area at the back, sides and thigh with an 
additional 1.0” layer of C-45 Confor® foam between the top and bottom layers.  The raised layers were 
credited with providing additional comfort (Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.  Comparison of B-2 ejection seat cushions.  Original cushion (left) and proposed 
cushion (right) are shown [70]. 
 Hearon and Brinkley [71] also showed that rate-dependent foam was more benign in +Z axis 
impact.  Cheng and Pellettiere [72] report on a broader set of cushions using the mid-size male Hybrid 
III.  Although differences were observed (presumably due to the shape as well as material properties), 
the authors conclude that lumbar spinal force is a better measure than specifying a specific type of foam.  
Finally, Miller and Morelli [73] compared several additional configurations with small female and large 
male Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs).  These tests included a 2 in (51 mm) C-47 Confor® foam 
cushion.  The authors concluded that it is safe to include 1 or 2 in (25 or 51 mm) Confor® foam in 
ejection seats. 
 Minimization of loads in the lumbar spine is the primary mitigation for preventing spinal injury, 
thus the use of rate-dependent foam in seat cushions is recommended, because it reduces +Z axis loads 
transmitted to the lower spine.  However, foam in the seat pan should not exceed 51 mm (2”). 
5.5.1 Verification Method 
 Verify that each is true for the system: 
• Verify the pallet, strut, seatback, and seat pan structure has a modal response is above 15 Hz. 
• Verify that no seat cushioning is used, or the seat cushioning material is similar to the 
Confor® foam tested in the above references and does not exceed 51 mm in thickness.  
Alternate Verification Method 
• For cases where the seat pan cushioning does not meet the specifications above, verify by 
analysis and test the design meets the Peak Axial Lumbar Compression Limits using the 
small female and large male anthropomorphic test device (ATD) as described in Section 7.5. 
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5.6 SUIT CONSIDERATIONS 
5.6.1 Chest Mounted Equipment 
 Chest mounted equipment have been shown to increase injury risk and this increase risk is not 
reflected in the BDRC prediction [74].  To apply the BDRC in the +X (eyeballs in) direction, chest 
mounted equipment are not allowed.  This includes rigid suit elements. 
5.6.1.1 Verification Method 
 Verify by inspection/analysis that the suit design has no rigid elements located over the chest 
(elements with masses greater than 0.5 kg). 
5.6.2 Rigid Suit Elements 
 Rigid suit components or seat/cockpit hardware that may impinge upon the occupant are not 
explicitly considered in the BDRC [75, 76].  Components that impinge upon the torso and or head/neck 
during transient loading are considered to create the highest potential for model invalidation and require 
inspection and/or analysis to ensure that no blunt trauma effects are induced.  Rigid components on 
extremities must also be inspected and/or analyzed as required, but generally are considered less 
detrimental provided that they do not cause fracture, immobilization, or overall compromise of occupant 
restraint during acceleration exposure. 
5.6.2.1 Verification Method 
 Verify by inspection and/or analysis that no rigid elements are within or could move within the 
load path (between the crewmember and seat/restraints) during dynamic events. 
5.6.3 Head Protection 
 Protecting the head from blunt impact is critical to protecting the crew.  Head injury from contact 
with surrounding seat and vehicle structures and helmet interior can induce significant loads leading to 
mild traumatic brain injury (MTBI), diffuse axonal injury (DAI) or skull fractures [77].  To provide 
adequate protection needed to validate the injury risk prediction of the BDRC, head protection must be 
included in the design.  In impact tests with volunteers used to develop the BDRC helmets except those 
+X axis reported by Brinkley [18], helmet liners were used within the helmets, which padded the head 
and lessened the impact magnitude. 
 Helmets used in the development of the BDRC Confor®med to ANSI Z90.1 [78].  For spacecraft 
design, instead of relying on certification tests requiring additional design constraints that may not have 
direct applicability or may overly constrain the design, test and analysis with an ATD is preferred.  This 
testing will ensure head contact with surrounding structures is not injurious directly instead of relying on 
a generic standard. 
5.6.3.1 Verification Method 
 Verify the following metrics by analysis and test using the small female and large male ATD as 
specified in Table 15: 
1. Head Injury Criterion (HIC15) (see Section 7.3.1). 
2. Head Rotational Acceleration (see Section 7.3.2). 
5.6.4 Helmet Mass 
 The experiments used to develop the BDRC included a helmet.  The maximum helmet mass 
tested was the Mercury program helmet with a weight of 2.7 kg.  The model may only be valid for 
designs with a helmet mass ≤2.7 kg unless special provisions are provided to prevent axial loading and 
increased bending moments to the neck during impact.  Such provisions may include design aspects of 
the pressure suit helmet that allow the helmet pressure seal ring to be supported by wearer’s shoulders 
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and straps from the suit prevent the helmet from rising upward with respect to the wearer’s head.  
However, the head and helmet should not be restrained to the seat structure. 
5.6.4.1 Verification Method 
 Analysis and test results showing helmet mass does not increase injury risk related to the Nij and 
neck axial force (see section 7.2) to the occupant using the small female and large male ATD as 
specified in Table 15. 
5.7 SPACEFLIGHT DECONDITIONING 
 Crewmembers experience varying levels of deconditioning related to exposure to microgravity.  
This includes changes to the musculoskeletal system [79-88].  Figure 14 shows example bone mineral 
density (BMD) losses after long-duration spaceflight.  Data were collected on crewmembers before the 
use of the advanced resistive exercise device, and may be conservative compared to today’s 
crewmember losses. 
 
Figure 14.  Changes in BMD after long-duration spaceflight [89]. 
 To account for changes in injury risk due to microgravity exposure, scaling factors have been 
developed to reduce the BDRC limits for specific regions of the body.  Additional information can be 
found in Lewendowski et al. and the HSIR Document [62, 90].  Table 12 shows the factors determined 
for regions of the body.  These factors are to be applied to any dynamic event occurring after 1 month of 
reduced gravity exposure.  These limits are an estimation of the necessary reduction in human tolerance 
to protect deconditioned crewmembers after up to 6 months in space.  For longer missions, 
deconditioning limits should be discussed and agreed to by a panel of medical experts. 
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TABLE 12.  DECONDITIONING FACTORS 
Anatomical Region Deconditioning Factor 
Spine 0.86 
Lower Extremities (including hip) 0.75 
All Other Regions 1.0 
 To account for the effects of spaceflight deconditioning, the spinal elements deconditioning 
factor has been applied to the DRz limits shown in Table 13.  To protect for femoral head and neck 
fractures in lateral impact conditions, the lower-extremities deconditioning factor has been applied to the 
DRY limits as well.  This was done to address the concern that pelvic restraint designs may not contact 
the iliac crest, concentrating the load on the femoral head and neck that is at a greater risk of fracture 
after spaceflight [91].  These values are to be used in cases where crewmembers have been exposed to 
reduced gravity for more than 1 month. 
TABLE 13.  DR LIMITS FOR SPACEFLIGHT DECONDITIONING 
Axis Direction Low Medium High 
Y Eyeballs left -11.3 ≤ DRY < 0 -15 ≤ DRY < -11.3 -22.5 ≤ DRY < -15 
Eyeballs right 0 ≤ DRY < 11.3 11.3 ≤ DRY < 15 15 ≤ DRY < 22.5 
Z Eyeballs up -11.5 ≤ DRz < 0 -14.1 ≤ DRz < -11.5 -17.5 ≤ DRz < -14.1 
Eyeballs down 0 ≤ DRz < 13.0 13.0 ≤ DRz < 15.4 15.4 ≤ DRz < 19.5 
5.7.1 Verification Method 
 Verify that each is true for the system: 
1. Verify by test and analysis that all cases meet the BDRC for X values in Table 9. 
2. Verify by test and analysis that all abort cases meet the BDRC for Y and Z values in Table 9. 
3. Verify by test and analysis that all non-abort cases meet the BDRC for Y and Z values in 
Table 13. 
6.0 LIMITATIONS 
 As discussed in Section 2.0, the limited data used to develop the models and the limitations 
imposed by the simplifications are inherent to the model.  Even if all of the above application rules are 
met, there are limitations of the BDRC.  Supplemental ATD and human testing is required to reduce the 
risk of injury to the crew. 
6.1 SEX DIFFERENCES 
 The BDRC was developed with primarily young, male military volunteers (see Section 2.0).  
Buhrman et al. found male and female DRs in -X axis were not significantly different [92]; however, it 
is unclear whether a difference exists in the other model directions. 
 Recent evidence indicates that small female occupants are at greater risk of injury due to 
dynamic loads, particularly in certain anatomical regions [93-95].  Because the BDRC does not predict 
the increased risk to female crewmembers, ATD assessments are required. 
 Female occupants have an increased risk of neck injury due to loading [96-99].  Pintar et al. 
report a 600 N decrease in neck compression loading tolerance for females compared to males [96].  
Failure loads in post-mortem human subjects due to pure compression were 1.2 ± 0.5 kN for females and 
2.5 ± 0.9 kN for males [100]. 
 In addition to neck compression tolerance changes, neck bending moment tolerance is also lower.  
Nightingale reports failure moments of 23.7 ± 3.4 Nm for flexion and 43.3 ± 9.3 Nm for extension in 
females [101].  For males, the failure moments were 29.0 ± 6.3 Nm and 49.5 ± 17.6 Nm for flexion and 
extension respectively [102]; a 12% to 18% decrease in tolerance between females and males. 
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 Finally, lateral neck bending tolerance is lower for female subjects.  Perry et al. measured neck 
moments were 29% higher in female subjects compared to the same conditions for males (25.2 Nm 
versus 19.3 Nm) [103]. 
 Although no significant differences in cervical lumbar BMD exist between healthy males and 
females [98, 104], when normalized for weight, lumbar and cervical spine stress is 15% greater in 
females [99].  The effect of an increase in cervical stress on the DRI probability of injury curve has not 
yet been established, but would be expected to lead to a slight increase in the probability of neck injury 
[99]. 
6.1.1 Required ATD Assessments to Address Sex Differences 
 To account for the differences in sex, the following metrics are required to be assessed to ensure 
safety for female crewmembers.  Depending on the chosen design implementation, the small female 
ATD may be the driving case for injury mitigation.  If this is not the case, sufficient rationale should be 
provided as to why they chose ATD size or sizes are necessary to adequately bound the problem. 
 Assess by test and analysis using the small female ATD as specified in Table 15.  Assess the 
following metrics: 
1. Nij (see Section 7.2.2). 
2. Peak Neck Axial Force Limits (see Section 7.2.3). 
6.2 AGE EFFECTS 
 During the aging process, physical changes affect a person’s tolerance to loading.  Published 
literature shows injury risk increases with age, due to effects such as decrease in bone strength, disc 
degeneration, ligament strength, and muscle strength and reaction [77, 105, 106]. 
 The BDRC is based on volunteer test data from subjects aged 18 to 58; however, a majority of 
the subjects were less than 30 years old.  Currently, the astronaut corps ranges in age from 32 to 56-years 
old, suggesting that the model may not sufficiently protect older crewmembers from injury. 
 Table 14 shows a comparison of lumbar vertebra breaking strength related to age 30 [104, 107-
109].  This change in strength is related to decrements in bone density in the vertebra.  These changes 
would be in addition to any changes or loss of vertebral strength due to spaceflight.  These results are 
based on a general population as compared to the astronaut corps, where adequate BMD is required for 
selection for flight [110]. 
TABLE 14.  COMPARISON OF LUMBAR FAILURE STRENGTH BY AGE - VALUES ARE 
COMPARED TO AGE 30 
 Age 40 Age 50 Age 60 
Lumbar Failure Force [104, 107] -11% -22% -35% 
 The DRI does include an age factor, which shows that the DRz response decreases with age [23].  
Although the BDRC does not adopt the age factor, it uses a 27.9-year-old male as the basis for this axis 
(median USAF aviator age) [23].  Changes in model dynamics related to age are shown in Figure 15 for 
a 50% risk of spinal fracture.  Maximum tolerable acceleration decreases with increased age. 
 However, because age-related BMD loss is controlled through crew selection criteria, no 
additional age-related decrement factor is included for the +Z axis.  In addition, there are currently not 
sufficient data available to propose limits based on age, nor to include supplemental ATD metrics. 
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Figure 15.  Dynamic Response Index (DRI) age effects.  Shown are the 
50% probability of spinal injury for various ages [23]. 
6.3 ANTHROPOMETRY EFFECTS 
 Anthropometry affects injury risk during dynamic events.  Smaller crewmembers are at a greater 
risk of neck injury.  Although smaller occupants have lower mass, the cross-sectional area of the cervical 
vertebra are smaller, causing significantly higher vertebral stress.  No significant lumbar stress 
correlations were found with height or sitting height for either males or females [99].  In addition, 
because different size crewmembers interact with the seat, suit, and restraints differently, testing with a 
small and large ATD is necessary to assess unique design specific interactions. 
6.3.1 Verification Methodology 
 Conduct test and analysis using the small female and large male ATD as specified in Table 15 to 
assess the following metrics: 
1. Nij (see section 7.2.2) 
2. Peak Neck Axial Force Limits (see Section 7.2.3) 
6.4 MILITARY TRAINING 
 Military personnel (males and females) have been found to have 15% to 20% greater BMD than 
non-military personnel [99].  BMD is correlated to breaking strength, indicating that non-military 
personnel may be at a greater risk of injury due to dynamic loads.  Because the BDRC is based on data 
collected from military test subjects, the injury limits may be under-conservative for non-military 
subjects.  Because astronaut fitness levels preflight are similar to military personnel, this limitation is 
believed to be controlled for NASA’s uses. 
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7.0 ATD SUPPLEMENTARY TEST AND ANALYSIS 
 In addition to the BDRC, the following assessments must be conducted to show the vehicle 
meets the requirements.  Testing is to be conducted per SAE J211/1 for test procedures, channel polarity 
and signal filtering [111]. 
7.1 ATD SPECIFICATIONS 
 All ATD tests must be conducted with the ATDs as specified in Table 15, with the appropriate 
size selected to meet the injury assessment reference values (IARV) shown in each table.  Summary 
Table 34 provides the required and additional ATD assessments.  Depending on the vehicle, seat and suit 
configuration, all 3 ATDs may not be required for design verification. 
TABLE 15.  ATD SPECIFICATIONS 
ATD Description 
Small Female 5
th percentile female automotive Hybrid III with a straight spine (default configuration) 
and articulated pelvis 
Mid-size Male 50th percentile male automotive Hybrid III with a straight spine and articulated pelvis 
Large Male 95th percentile male automotive Hybrid III with a straight spine and articulated pelvis 
7.1.1 Head Specification Revision 
 The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) heads were originally selected because they are more 
representative of real human heads.  For the small female, the standard Hybrid III head is undersized, 
whereas the 8.1 lbf JSF headform is a much more realistic representation of the true head mass.  
Similarly, for the large male Hybrid III, the 11.0 lbf JSF head is more representative of a large male.  For 
JSF both heads, anatomical features are also included such as a chin and ear auricle. 
 After publishing the initial specifications for the Hybrid III configurations, it was decided that the 
JSF heads are not necessary.  The reasons are threefold.  First, the original injury metrics (Head Injury 
Criteria, head rotational acceleration, neck axial forces, and Nij) were not developed with the JSF heads, 
but instead were developed with the standard Hybrid III headforms.  The JSF headforms are heavier than 
the Hybrid III heads, so the predicted neck loadings are expected to be larger than for the Hybrid III 
headform; however, the head accelerations might be lower with heavier JSF heads.  The second reason 
for the change is because numerical models of the JSF headforms are not available.  One of the 
advantages of selecting the Hybrid III standard headforms is the availability of numerical models.  The 
third reason for returning to the Hybrid III headforms is because of availability of the physical headform.  
Although they may be procured, they are not commonly available at testing facilities. 
7.1.2 Pelvis and Spine Specifications 
 Table 15 specifies the use of the articulating pelvis and straight spine (mid-size and large male) 
options for the Hybrid III.  This requirement was made for several reasons.  First, for seat designs with 
an acute seat pan angle, the sitting pelvis does not typically fit.  Because ATD fit in the seat is critical for 
obtaining realistic responses, this was considered an important addition.  For seats that do not have a 
significant acute seat pan angle, the sitting pelvis may be acceptable; however, without further test data, 
it is unclear if the pelvis configuration will result in differences in head and neck responses.  So for 
consistency, the sitting pelvis was disallowed.  The straight spine specification for the mid-size and large 
male ATD is required if the optional lumbar axial force limit is invoked, as the automotive curved spine 
is not adequate for generating lumbar forces for assessing injury risk for seat cushioning.  In addition, 
similar to the differences in pelvis design, it is unclear if differences between the two spines will affect 
other ATD responses, so the curved spine option is also disallowed during physical testing.  In addition, 
NASA experience with ATD testing has shown that ATDs with the sitting pelvis are extremely difficult 
to fit into a pressure suit, and may even be difficult to fit into a spacecraft-type seat or full-scale vehicle 
test. 
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 In regards to numerical modeling of the Hybrid III, there are not currently models of the 
articulating pelvis for all sizes and straight spine for the large male Hybrid III.  Because of this, use of a 
sitting pelvis and curved spine Hybrid III model is allowed; however, care must be taken to adequately 
position the ATD in the seat and minimize gaps.  NASA experience has shown that even if the physical 
ATD does not fit properly in the seat, it is possible to manipulate the models into a spacecraft type seat 
using gravity and belt tensioning to preload the ATD.  Care must be taken to not over-preload the ATD 
model and generate large initial preloads in the model.  In addition, if the seat cushioning exceeds the 
ground rule in section 5.5, alternate methods of assessing the lumbar load, which is beyond the scope of 
this report, are needed (such as using DRI to select the worst case lumbar load case and then conduct 
testing with the straight spine). 
7.2 NECK INJURY ASSESSMENT 
7.2.1 Current HSIR Limits - Individual Limits 
7.2.1.1 Neck Axial Compression Force 
 Neck compression is of particular concern during spacecraft landing, because there can be a 
significant +Z acceleration (eyeballs down) causing neck compression from the inertial effects of the 
head.  In addition, any head mounted mass, such as a helmet, could increase the load on the neck.  The 
upper neck compressive force limits chosen for the HSIR have been derived from the automotive injury 
biomechanics and injury assessment literature and as codified in the NHTSA FMVSS 208, Occupant 
Crash Protection [112].  Mertz [113] does not give risk curves for neck compressive loading or neck 
shear loading.  Lacking that information, a conservative estimate of low risk (approximately 0.5%) can 
be made by taking the data on volunteer static loading of the neck from Mertz [114] as a surrogate for 
low-risk dynamic loading in compression and shear (Table 16). 
TABLE 16.  HSIR PEAK UPPER NECK AXIAL COMPRESSION FORCE IARVs 
Peak Neck Axial 
Compression Force 
(N) 
Nominal Off-Nominal 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
Non-Deconditioned 693 1,100 1,328 2,520 4,000 4,830 
Deconditioned 596 946 1,142 2,167 3,440 4,154 
7.2.1.2 Neck Axial Tension Force 
 In analyzing the biomechanical database for upper neck tension, the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers noted there was one fatal neck lesion at the 5% risk level.  As a result, the 3% risk level 
for neck tension was chosen for implementation in FMVSS 208 [112].  The worst case for neck tension 
loading is considered to be when the neck muscles are tensed only to the degree required to keep the 
head upright.  Mertz [113] shows neck tension risk curves for serious neck injury limits with minimum 
muscle tone (see Table 17). 
TABLE 17.  HSIR PEAK UPPER NECK AXIAL TENSION FORCE IARVs 
Peak Neck Axial 
Compression Force 
(N) 
Nominal Off-Nominal 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
Non-Deconditioned 734 1,097 1,323 2,513 4,000 5,030 
Deconditioned 631 943 1,138 2,161 3,440 4,326 
7.2.1.3 Neck Bending Moments 
 The concept of predicting neck injuries due to bending has been studied for almost as long as 
head injury prediction.  The present bending moment limit criteria for fore and aft bending (i.e., flexion 
and extension) are based on the work of Mertz and Patrick [115] in which the necks of volunteers and 
cadavers were inertially loaded by head motion in sled tests where the subjects were restrained by belt 
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restraints or seatbacks without head support.  The concept of neck injury due to bending is based on the 
concern for excessive bending motion (in flexion, extension, or lateral bending) causing ligamentous and 
boney damage as the vertebrae impinge in extreme motion. Since neck motion is difficult to measure 
with transducers in an ATD, the bending-moment levels associated with excessive motion in cadaver 
tests was used by Mertz and Patrick as an indicator of potential impingement.  Mertz [113] does not give 
risk curves for neck bending moments.  Lacking that information, a conservative estimate of low risk 
(~0.5%) can be made by taking the data on volunteer static neck loading from Patrick and Chou [116] as 
a surrogate for low-risk dynamic loading in neck flexion and lateral bending.  Mertz [113] presents a risk 
curve for extension moment values related to serious injury for the case of minimum muscle tone in 
various sized dummies.  Values are shown in Table 18. 
TABLE 18.  HSIR UPPER NECK BENDING MOMENTS 
Peak Neck Moments [Nm] 
Nominal Off-Nominal 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
Extension Non-Deconditioned 17 39 49 33 65 87 Deconditioned 15 34 42 28 56 75 
Flexion Non-Deconditioned 49 96 96 104 190 258 Deconditioned 42 83 83 89 163 222 
Lateral Non-Deconditioned 38 75 75 72 143 143 Deconditioned 33 65 65 62 123 123 
7.2.2 Proposed HSIR Limits - Nij Neck Injury Criteria 
 Previous studies have shown that combined axial loading and bending moments have a higher 
injury potential than for pure axial loading [117-120]. 
 The Nij expanded upon the research of Prasad and Daniel to address injury risk in all four 
combinations of loading and bending.  NHTSA first published this revision in 1996 [121].  The “ij” 
refers to each combination of axial force and sagittal plane bending moment: NTE for tension-extension, 
NTF for tension-flexion, NCE for compression-extension, and NCF for compression-flexion.  In addition, 
lateral bending moments combined with axial force are also included: NTL for tension-lateral and NCL for 
compression-lateral.  Each combination is calculated using Equation 6 for each ATD size based on 
critical values (Table 19).  The maximum of each combination determines the final Nij score (Equation 
7).  In addition, pure tension and compression axial load limits are also specified. 
 The Nij critical values have been revised several times since the first NHTSA proposal [122-124].  
A more detailed explanation of the development of the criteria and associated critical values can be 
found in these references. 
 The moment used in the Nij calculation (Equation 6) is the effective moment at the occipital 
condyle and is determined by Equation 5. 
Equation 5.  Effective Moment at the Occipital Condyle 
𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡) =  𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) −  𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡) ∙ 𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 
Where: 
𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡) Is the effective moment at the occipital condyle 
𝑀𝑀𝑦𝑦(𝑡𝑡) Is the sagittal plane moment measured at the upper neck load cell 
𝐹𝐹𝑥𝑥(𝑡𝑡) Is the x-axis shear force measured at the upper neck load cell 
𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 Is the height of the upper neck load cell above the condyles 
Equation 6.  Nij Calculation 
𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = 𝐹𝐹𝑧𝑧(𝑡𝑡)𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡)𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  
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𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 Is the normalized neck injury risk for each combination (𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ,𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ,𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 ,𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇) 
𝐹𝐹𝑧𝑧(𝑡𝑡) Is the axial force in the prescribed direction 
𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 Is the critical axial force limit in the prescribed direction 
𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜(𝑡𝑡) Is the effective moment at the occipital condyle in the prescribed direction 
𝑀𝑀𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 Is the critical sagittal moment limit in the prescribed direction 
Equation 7. 
𝑁𝑁𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 = max(𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ,𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 ,𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 ,𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑇𝑇 ,𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿 ,𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) 
 It is important to note that the maximum Nij value may not occur at the same time point as the 
maximum of either the axial load or sagittal moment, since it is the combined value at any time point 
that is correlated to injury.  In addition, the spinal element deconditioning factor shown in Table 12 must 
also be applied to the Nij when necessary. 
TABLE 19.  NASA PROPOSED CRITICAL VALUES 
Nij Critical Values Small Female Hybrid III 
Mid-size Male Hybrid 
III 
Large Male Hybrid 
III 
Fc Tension 4,287 Nm 6,806 Nm 8,216 Nm 
Fc Compression 3,880 Nm 6,160 Nm 7,440 Nm 
Mc Extension 67 Nm 135 Nm 179 Nm 
Mc Flexion 155 Nm 310 Nm 415 Nm 
Mc Lateral 67 Nm 135 Nm 179 Nm 
 The maximum Nij limits were determined by expert consensus (Table 20).  Currently, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) uses a limit 0.5 for the F-35 crew escape system [125].  Based on the 
existing injury risk functions, this corresponds to approximately a 10% risk of an AIS≥3 injury risk; 
however, this level was deemed acceptable for two reasons: 
1. the injury risk is based on a general population, so crewmembers may not be at as great a 
risk, and 
2. there is uncertainty in the injury risk function at this level (an Nij = 0 equates to a 4% risk of 
AIS≥3 due to the statistical model used). 
This injury risk level differs from the levels denoted in Table 23 because of the limitations discussed 
above. 
 In addition, the spinal element deconditioning factor shown in Table 12 must also be applied the 
Nij when necessary.  The regions of acceptable neck dynamics are shown in Figures 16, 18 and 20 for 
the small female, mid-size male, and large male Hybrid III ATDs respectively. 
TABLE 20.  NASA PROPOSED IARVs 
Nij Limit 
Non-Deconditioned Deconditioned 
Nominal Off-Nominal Nominal Off-Nominal 
Small Female 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Mid-size Male 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Large Male 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
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Figure 16.  Small female Hybrid III sagittal Nij regions. 
 
Figure 17.  Small female Hybrid III lateral Nij regions. 
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Figure 18.  Mid-size Male Hybrid III sagittal Nij regions. 
 
Figure 19.  Mid-size Male Hybrid III lateral Nij regions. 
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Figure 20.  Large male Hybrid III Nij regions. 
 
Figure 21.  Large male Hybrid III lateral Nij regions. 
7.2.3 Proposed HSIR Limits -Neck Axial Force Injury Criteria 
 In addition to the Nij, maximum neck load limits are also required.  The values and method 
reported here are currently in use by the DoD for the F-35 crew escape system, as described by Nichols 
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[125].  Figure 22 shows how to determine the peak-duration values for a particular waveform with the 
resulting amplitude-duration curve shown in Figure 23.  Table 21 and Figure 24 show the limits for 
upper neck axial tension force in Newtons.  Table 22 and Figure 25 show the limits for upper neck axial 
compression force in Newtons. 
 
Figure 22.  Neck force peak-duration determination.  The red box shows a 5-ms sustained force 
above 3,700 N, the gray box shows a 55-ms sustained force above 2,000 N, and the green box 
shows an 80 ms sustained force above 1,300 N.  Note that although the spike at 60 ms is very large 
in amplitude, it is less than 5 ms and is ignored. 
 
Figure 23.  Resulting peak axial force by duration from waveform shown in Figure 22.  The 
colored dots correspond with the boxes shown in Figure 22. 
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TABLE 21.  PEAK NECK AXIAL TENSION VALUES 
  Time [ms] Conditioned Deconditioned 
Neck Axial 
Tension 
Force 
Duration 
Limits [N] 
Small Female 
5 1,840 1,580 
31 1,840 1,580 
40 890 765 
80 890 765 
Mid-size Male 
5 2,750 2,360 
35 2,750 2,360 
45 1,420 1,220 
80 1,420 1,220 
Large Male 
5 3,390 2,910 
37 3,390 2,910 
48 2,000 1,720 
80 2,000 1,720 
TABLE 22.  PEAK NECK AXIAL COMPRESSION VALUES 
  Time [ms] Conditioned Deconditioned 
Neck Axial 
Compression 
Force 
Duration 
Limits [N] 
Small Female 
5 2,310 1,990 
27 890 765 
80 890 765 
Mid-size Male 
5 3,510 3,020 
30 1,420 1,220 
80 1,420 1,220 
Large Male 
5 4,360 3,750 
32 2,000 1,720 
80 2,000 1,720 
 
Figure 24.  Peak neck axial tension limits. 
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Figure 25.  Peak neck axial compression limits. 
7.2.4 Limitations of the Proposed Neck Injury Assessment 
 Although these neck injury assessments are based on current methods in the injury biomechanics 
field, there are limitations associated with the injury predictions. 
 First, the Hybrid III neck is not biofidelic in its response.  In tension, recent results by Dibb et al. 
show it to be much stiffer than a human neck.  In forward flexion, the head and neck response is also 
stiffer than in live human testing [126].  In the lateral direction, the neck is not biofidelic and has been 
shown to also be very stiff [127]. 
 In regard to the IARVs related to neck injury, the Nij work is based on injury to juvenile pigs 
with the 3-year-old Hybrid III ATD tested in matching conditions [120].  The 3-year-old values were 
then scaled to the different ATD sizes [122].  In addition, the lateral bending moment limits were 
selected based on the extension moments, with the assumption that this selection is conservative. 
 For the axial force limits, the limits presented in Figures 24 and 25 have been revised from the 
original work published by Mertz [114].  Changes were made by the U.S. Navy and USAF to raise the 
long-duration limits and limit the maximum allowable force to 5 ms based on previous experience [125]. 
7.3 HEAD INJURY METRICS 
 Because the BDRC does not require head restraint, measures to protect the head are appropriate.  
Brain injury is more concerning for spaceflight (as opposed to skull fracture that may occur from higher 
loads), since conservation of emergency self-egress capability is required.  Recent studies of football 
players have established MTBI risk related to both linear and rotational head acceleration.  Linear 
acceleration has been shown to cause injury and the HIC is a validated metric for assessing injury risk.  
As recent work in the automotive community has shown that rotational head acceleration contributes to 
risk of head injury, this metric is included to enhance the protection provided by the BDRC. 
 Because head injury risk is highest for cases in which head impacts occur, suitable testing 
conditions must be used.  For example, if head impact may occur with surrounding vehicle structure, a 
mock-up of the structure must be included during test to ensure any derived head injury metric is not 
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exceeded.  The mock-up must ensure sufficient fidelity to replicate the dimensions and nature of 
injurious forces imparted to the head so as to ensure the preventative measures are adequate. 
 The updated limits are based on the injury risk limits shown in Table 23.  This allows consistent 
risk estimates for each metric. 
TABLE 23.  ACCEPTABLE RISK LIMITS 
Injury Level Nominal Off-Nominal 
AIS1+ 5% 19% 
AIS2+ 1% 4% 
AIS3+ 0.3% 1% 
AIS4+ 0.03% 0.1% 
7.3.1 Linear Head Acceleration 
 Assessing the potential for head injury (e.g., brain and skull injury) has been a primary focus in injury 
biomechanics research for more than 40 years.  The pioneering efforts by researchers to predict brain injury 
from head acceleration measurements led to the Wayne State Tolerance Curve (WSTC) [128].  Using the 
observation that most emergency room patients admitted with simple linear skull fractures were concussed 
(although not all concussed patients had skull fractures), they hypothesized that determining the translational 
head accelerations associated with the initiation of linear skull fractures in drop tests of embalmed cadaver 
heads would give an estimate of concussion occurrence.  The extreme association of the limit accelerations 
with the durations of impact found in those tests for contact durations below 4 ms led Gadd [129] to plot the 
data on a logarithmic scale that exhibited a linear relationship with a slope of -2.5 between the peak 
acceleration and time duration on a log-log plot. Gadd proposed the Gadd Severity Index (GSI), a weighted 
impulse criteria in which the integral of the measured head acceleration over time, raised to the 2.5 power 
was a measure of head injury potential based on the WSTC.  Because the time interval for calculating the 
GSI was not specified, this led to confusion over the interpretation of more complex head acceleration 
waveforms.  Versace [130] proposed an optimization method to search for the acceleration time interval, (t2-
t1) that would maximize the GSI.  This is referred to as the Head Injury Criteria (HIC) and codified by the 
NHTSA.  All passenger cars sold in the U.S. must meet a designated level of HIC in a 35-mph barrier crash 
test for the vehicle occupants.  Equation 8 is used to calculate the HIC.  The HIC is most valid for head 
accelerations due to contact with a generally rigid surface [131], so the 15 ms time interval was selected. 
Equation 8.  Head Injury Criteria (HIC) Formula 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻15 = max
0≤𝑖𝑖2−𝑖𝑖1≤0.015 �(𝑡𝑡2 − 𝑡𝑡1) �� 𝑎𝑎(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖2𝑖𝑖1 1𝑡𝑡2 − 𝑡𝑡1�2.5� 
7.3.1.1 Current HSIR Limits 
 Currently, the HSIR limits are based on an extrapolation of the injury risk curve published by 
Mertz [113].  These values are related to an AIS≥4 brain injury. 
TABLE 24:  HSIR HIC 15 IARVs 
HIC 
15 
Nominal Off-Nominal 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
  300   700  
7.3.1.2 Proposed HSIR Limits 
 Recent studies of MTBI in football players can be very useful for determining the appropriate 
threshold for head injury.  As AIS 1 and 2 injuries to the brain are of primary concern, the HIC injury 
risk functions from Funk, et al. will be used (Equation 9) [132].  These data were chosen over the 
Virginia Tech data reported by Funk in 2012 because the HIC values from the 2007 study are more 
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conservative [133].  Because concussion injury risk determined from NASCAR head injury modeling 
resulted in much higher allowable HIC values [134], the Funk HIC 15 curve will be used since these 
limits are more conservative. 
Equation 9.  Head Injury Criteria Injury Risk Model 
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 ≥ 1) =  1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝛽𝛽 �𝛼𝛼 
Where: 
Α is the cut point for the specified AIS level 
𝛽𝛽 is the regression coefficient 
TABLE 25:  HIC 15 INJURY RISK MODEL COEFFICIENTS 
Variable Α 𝜷𝜷 
AIS≥1 4.34 671 
 
Figure 26.  HIC 15 Injury Risk Function [132] 
 Using the scaling function (Equation 10 and Table 26) proposed by the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers Association [113, 135], values for the small and large ATDs can be determined (Table 
27). 
Equation 10.  HIC Ratio 
𝜆𝜆𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐿𝐿 =  𝜆𝜆𝜎𝜎2.5  ∙  𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿−1.5 
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Where: 
𝜆𝜆𝑎𝑎 =  𝜆𝜆𝜎𝜎  ∙  𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿−1  is the acceleration ratio 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 =  𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 is the time ratio 
𝜆𝜆𝐿𝐿 is the head size ratio 
𝜆𝜆𝜎𝜎 is the failure stress ratio 
TABLE 26.  HIC SCALING FACTORS 
ATD 𝝀𝝀𝑳𝑳 𝝀𝝀𝝈𝝈𝒇𝒇  𝝀𝝀𝒕𝒕 𝝀𝝀𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯 Nominal HIC Off-Nominal HIC 
Small Female 0.931 1.00 0.931 1.113 375 525 
Mid-size Male 1.000 1.00 1.000 1.000 340 470 
Large Male 1.030 1.00 1.030 0.957 325 450 
TABLE 27:  HIC 15 IARVs 
HIC 15 
Nominal Off-Nominal 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
375 340 325 525 470 450 
7.3.2 Rotational Head Acceleration 
7.3.2.1 Current HSIR Limits 
None 
7.3.2.2 Proposed HSIR Limits 
 Pellman et al. [136] report concussion related to rotational accelerations in professional football 
players.  The IARVs are related to the risk of MTBI that includes concussions.  As with HIC 15, the 
updated limits are based on the injury risk limits shown in Table 23. 
 Recent data published by Rowson indicate that the Pellman data may be conservative [137]; 
however, given the age of the subjects in both studies (younger than the current astronaut population), 
the Pellman injury risk function was chosen (Equation 11). 
Equation 11.  Head Rotational Acceleration Injury Risk Model 
𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴 ≥ 1) = 1 1 + 𝑒𝑒(𝛼𝛼−𝛽𝛽∙𝑥𝑥) 
Where: 
α is regression constant 
𝛽𝛽 is the regression coefficient 
TABLE 28.  HIC 15 INJURY RISK MODEL COEFFICIENTS 
Variable α 𝜷𝜷 
AIS≥1 4.939 0.0009 
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Figure 27.  Head rotational acceleration injury risk function (AIS≥1) [136]. 
TABLE 29.  HEAD ROTATIONAL ACCELERATION IARVs 
Head CG Rotational 
Acceleration [rad/s2] 
Nominal  
[5% risk of MTBI] 
Off-Nominal  
[19% risk of MTBI] 
Mid-size Male 2,200 3,800 
 Using the same scaling function as the HIC (Table 30), values for the small and large ATDs can 
be determined (Table 31).  The head rotational acceleration IARVs are for resultant accelerations at the 
location of the ATD head accelerometer. 
TABLE 30.  HEAD CG ROTATIONAL ACCELERATION SCALING FACTORS 
ATD 𝝀𝝀𝜶𝜶 Nominal α Off-Nominal α 
Small Female 1.113 2,450 4,230 
Mid-size Male 1.000 2,200 3,800 
Large Male 0.957 2,100 3,640 
TABLE 31.  HEAD CG ROTATIONAL ACCELERATION IARVs 
Head CG Rotational 
Acceleration [rad/s2] 
Nominal Off-Nominal 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
Small 
Female 
Mid-size 
Male 
Large 
Male 
2,500 2,200 2,100 4,200 3,800 3,600 
7.3.3 Limitations of the Proposed Head Injury Assessment 
 The HIC has been used in the automotive industry for many years; however, there are limitations.  
The HIC was developed for cases were head impacts occur.  Consequently, HIC values without head 
impacts are not a valid measure of head injury risk.  Also, the values proposed are based on football 
player concussion risk, which may not be an accurate analog to spacecraft occupants.  Age is also a 
factor in predicting concussion risk [138], so the differences in age between the subjects studied and 
astronaut corps may affect injury risk. 
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 Head rotational acceleration has also been proposed to contribute to concussion; however, there 
is a wide range of proposed limits for preventing brain injury, so the values proposed here may be 
conservative.  As with HIC, age is a factor in predicting concussion risk [138], so the differences in age 
between the subjects studied and astronaut corps may affect injury risk. 
 Finally, the combination of head linear and rotational acceleration may be important in predicting 
brain injury.  Currently, additional research is needed to understand this effect. 
7.4 FLAIL LIMIT 
 To assess flail of the upper extremities, a method of simulating bracing is needed; otherwise, 
complex restraints would be required to arrest upper limb movement.  Because grasping strength is most 
likely the main inhibitor of arm flail, the following limits were chosen based on values reported in the 
HSIR document [62].  The values (Table 32) chosen for nominal small-female testing are based on the 
unpressurized suited grasp strength for other operations (from HSIR Table F4.0-3).  The mid-size and 
large male values are scaled based on ATD mass and values are rounded to 2 significant digits.  These 
values are similar to the values used in military ejection seat testing scaled to similar sized ATDs. 
TABLE 32.  FLAIL BRACING BREAK CORD FORCE LIMITS 
ATD Size Break Cord Limit [N] 
Small Female 490 
Mid-size Male 780 
Large Male 980 
 If active bracing is relied on to prevent flail, testing with cord that breaks at the limits shown in 
Table 32 must be conducted.  The design is considered acceptable if the arms do not flail beyond the 
envelope of the seat. 
 For lower extremities, grasping strength is not possible, and bracing is most likely insufficient for 
arresting lower extremity movement.  Instead, sufficient restraints are needed to minimize limb 
movement to less than 25mm in any direction. 
7.5 LUMBAR AXIAL COMPRESSION FORCE 
 Lumbar axial compression force limits are given in the Full Spectrum Crashworthiness Criteria 
for Rotorcraft [139] and are based on limits derived by Desjardins [140].  These limits correspond to a 
DRz of 18.0 (5% risk of lumbar-thoracic spinal fracture), and correspond to the off-nominal BDRC 
limits.  To determine nominal limits, linear scaling was used with the DRz value of 15.2 (nominal BDRC 
limit) similar to the method used by Desjardins to scale the lumbar load to higher DRz values.  The 
deconditioned values were determined by applying the spinal deconditioning factor of 0.86 (from Table 
12).  Values are rounded to 2 significant digits (Table 33).  Because these limits are based on the DRz, 
the same limitations discussed in Section 2.0 apply. 
TABLE 33.  LUMBAR AXIAL COMPRESSION FORCE LIMITS 
Peak Lumbar Axial 
Compression Force [N] 
Non-Deconditioned Deconditioned 
Nominal Off-Nominal Nominal Off-Nominal 
Small Female  3,500 4,200 3,000 3,600 
Mid-size Male 5,300 6,200 4,600 5,300 
Large Male  6,600 7,800 5,700 6,700 
7.6 SUMMARY 
 Following is a summary of the required ATD assessments and alternate ATD assessments that 
may be required depending on the design and the alternate verification methods chosen. 
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TABLE 34.  SUPPLEMENTAL ATD ASSESSMENTS.  UNSHADED METRICS ARE REQUIRED, 
SHADED METRIC IS ONLY REQUIRED IF AMPLIFICATION VERIFICATION METHOD IS NOT 
MET. 
ATD Metric ATD Size Non-Deconditioned Deconditioned 
Nominal Off-Nominal Nominal Off-Nominal 
HIC 15 
Small female 375 525 375 525 
Mid-size male 340 470 340 470 
Large male 325 450 325 450 
Head Rotational 
Acceleration 
[rad/sec2] 
Small female 2,500 4,200 2,500 4,200 
Mid-size male 2,200 3,800 2,200 3,800 
Large male 2,100 3,600 2,100 3,600 
Nij 
Small female 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Mid-size male 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Large male 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 
Peak Neck Axial 
Tension Force [N]* 
Small female 890 - 1,840 765 - 1,580 
Mid-size male 1,420 - 2,750 1,220 - 2,360 
Large male 2,000 - 3,390 1,720 - 2,910 
Peak Neck Axial 
Compression Force 
[N]* 
Small female 890 - 2,310 765 - 1,990 
Mid-size male 1,420 - 3,510 1,220 - 3,020 
Large male 2,000 - 4,360 1,720 - 3,750 
Flail 
Small female Pass 
Mid-size male Pass 
Large male Pass 
Peak Lumbar 
Axial Compression 
[N]** 
Small female 3,500 4,200 3,000 3,600 
Mid-size male 5,300 6,200 4,600 5,300 
Large male 6,600 7,800 5,700 6,700 
* Values in table are evaluated at varying time durations as discussed in Section 7.2.3 
** Only applicable if amplification application rule is not met as discussed in Section 5.5 
8.0 DESIGN VALIDATION APPROACH 
 NASA-STD-7009A, Standard for Models and Simulations, defines verification as the process of 
ascertaining the extent to which a model meets its requirements and specifications, and validation as the 
process of ascertaining that the model represents reality[141].  Because the current finite element (FE) 
and mathematical models of the different sizes and versions of ATDs were not developed to simulate the 
ATD responses in all loading directions and dynamic ranges assessed in spaceflight occupant protection 
analysis, there is concern that the models are not sufficiently validated for use without physical testing.  
In addition, there are no validated standard practices to adequately model the ATD-suit-restraint-seat 
interaction.  When referring to the combined model consisting of the ATD, suit elements, restraints, and 
seat, the term “occupant model” will be used. 
 To address concerns associated with relying on an invalidated occupant model, a combination of 
test and analysis is required to determine the occupant-model accuracy and acceptability for 
demonstrating a spacecraft can meet safety requirements for human-flight certification.  This is typically 
a multi-phased approach with a combination of test and analysis to support model development, 
validation, and eventually certification.  An example of this approach is shown in Figure 28.  If an 
alternate approach is used, sufficient justification and documentation is required to meet the intent of this 
approach. 
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Figure 28.  Example process for ATD modeling verification and validation. 
 We recognize that each spacecraft will have unique environments and hardware configurations 
that could influence occupant protection results.  As the physical and analytical Hybrid III ATDs will be 
used under multi-axial loading beyond their validation, the quality of the model must be established and 
meet or exceed minimum credibility-assessment scale (CAS) scores per NASA-STD-7009A as shown in 
Table 35 [141].  A credibility-assessment score is determined using the descriptions in Table 35 and the 
resulting model-uncertainty factor (MUFs) for each occupant model.  This score may then be used as an 
overall subjective score to rate the overall quality of the occupant model. 
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TABLE 35.  MINIMUM CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT SCALE SCORES (GREEN) PER NASA-
STD-7009A 
 M&S Development M&S Use (Operations) Supporting Evidence 
Level Data Pedigree Verification Validation Input Pedigree Uncertainty 
Characterization 
Results 
Robustness 
M&S History M&S 
Process/Product 
Management 
4 All data known & 
traceable to RWS 
with acceptable 
accuracy, precision  
and uncertainty. 
Reliable practices 
applied to verify 
the end-to-end 
model; all model 
errors satisfy 
requirements. 
All M&S outputs 
agree with data 
from the RWS 
over the full range 
of operation in its 
real operating 
environment. 
All input data 
known & traceable 
to RWS with 
acceptable 
accuracy, 
precision, and 
uncertainty. 
Statistical analysis 
of the output 
uncertainty after 
propagation of all 
known sources of 
uncertainty. 
Sensitivities known 
for most 
parameters; most 
key sensitivities 
identified.  
Nearly identical 
model and use. 
Controlled processes 
are applied; 
measurements used 
for process 
improvement. 
3 All data known & 
traced to sufficient 
referent. 
Significant data 
has acceptable 
accuracy, 
precision, and 
uncertainty. 
Formal practices 
applied to verify 
the end-to-end 
model; all 
important errors 
satisfy 
requirements. 
All key M&S 
outputs agree with 
data from the 
RWS operating in 
a representative 
environment. 
All input data 
known & traced to 
sufficient referent. 
Significant input 
data has acceptable 
accuracy, 
precision, and 
uncertainty. 
Uncertainty of 
results are 
provided 
quantitatively 
through 
propagation of all 
known 
uncertainty. 
Sensitivities 
known for many 
parameters 
including many of 
the key 
sensitivities. 
At most minor 
changes in model 
and at most minor 
differences in 
model use. 
Controlled processes 
are applied; process 
compliance is 
measured. 
2 Some data known 
& formally 
traceable with 
estimated 
uncertainties. 
Documented 
practices applied 
to verify all model 
features; most 
important errors 
satisfy 
requirements. 
Key M&S outputs 
agree with data 
from a sufficiently 
similar referent 
system. 
Some input data 
known and 
formally traceable 
with estimated 
uncertainties. 
Most sources of 
uncertainty 
identified, 
expressed 
quantitatively, and 
correctly 
classified. 
Propagation of the 
uncertainties is 
assessed. 
Sensitivities 
known for a few 
parameters. Few 
or no key 
sensitivities 
identified. 
At most moderate 
changes in model 
and at most 
moderate 
differences in 
model use. 
Formal processes are 
applied. 
1 Some data known 
and formally 
traceable. 
Informal practices 
applied to verify 
some features of 
the model and 
assess errors. 
Conceptual model 
addresses problem 
statement and 
agrees with 
available 
referents. 
Some input data 
known and 
formally traceable. 
Sources of 
uncertainty 
identified and 
qualitatively 
assessed. 
Qualitative 
estimates only for 
sensitivities in 
M&S. 
New model or 
major changes in 
model, or major 
differences in 
model use; but, 
model/changes/uses 
documented. 
Informal processes 
are applied. 
0 Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
Insufficient 
evidence. 
8.1 CASE SELECTION APPROACH 
 A critical component to validating a design is selection of critical cases.  Because ATD responses 
are nonlinear and sensitive to complex loading kinematics, it is important to use models to adequately 
explore the range of expected dynamics and estimated ATD responses to determine the cases that elicit 
the greatest responses.  An example approach to selecting the appropriate cases is shown in Figure 29.  If 
an alternate approach is used, sufficient justification and documentation are required to meet the intent 
of this approach. 
 
Figure 29.  Case selection approach. 
 The first step of this process is guided by the vehicle level requirements levied on the design for 
nominal and off-nominal performance.  Examples of vehicle level requirements are given in Table 36. 
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TABLE 36.  EXAMPLE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS 
Condition Statistical Level Cases that must meet the IARVs Probability of Occurrence 
Nominal No Fault ≥ 3σ 99.875% 98.9% 
Off-Nominal 1 Fault ≥ 2σ 97.7% 1% 
Contingency 2 or more Faults ≥ 1σ 84.1% 0.1% 
 In the example given above, assuming a distribution of 10,000 possible landings, a vehicle must 
have a nominal landing with no faults for more than 9,890 landings, off-nominal landings with 1 fault in 
less than 100 cases, and contingency landing cases with 2 or more faults in less than 10 cases. 
 Using all possible nominal (no fault) water landings as an example, 99.875% of these landings 
would need to pass the ATD IARVs and Brinkley Low criterion or 9,878 cases out of 9,890 landings.  
For off-nominal landings (e.g., loss of parachute), 98 of 100 landings would be required to pass, and for 
contingency landings (2 or more faults), 9 of the 10 cases would have to pass.  Lower statistical 
performance levels are allowed for off-nominal and contingency scenarios because their probability of 
occurrence is much lower. 
 Using guidance and navigation control (GNC) models, Monte Carlo simulation distributions are 
generated for the given spacecraft design, expected environments, faults, and performance.  From these 
distributions, nominal and off-nominal cases can be identified with initial conditions defining the state of 
the vehicle just before water impact.  Full-vehicle-mathematical models can be used with these impact 
conditions to generate seat-specific accelerations and determine occupant response. 
 To assess spacecraft performance against the requirements listed in Table 36, injury predictions 
would need to be generated for all possible seated locations, crew sizes, and nominal, off-nominal, or 
contingency scenarios.  We acknowledge that generating occupant-model responses across all locations, 
crew sizes, and scenarios would be computationally intensive and potentially cost and time prohibitive.  
Thus, alternate approaches to identifying driving cases, such as development of mathematical or 
response surfaces, may be utilized [142]. 
 For example, an occupant model can be used to predict responses for a subset of selected cases 
(black dots in Figure 30).  Using these results, a response surface can be created for each occupant 
response across the design space for a particular scenario (e.g., nominal landings).  The ATD injury-
metric responses and Brinkley response criterion values can be mapped to individual response surfaces.  
From these surfaces, high-injury-risk cases can be identified and utilized as the driving cases for 
selecting test cases for occupant-model development, model validation, and eventually flight 
certification.  Final vehicle certification for Occupant Protection performance will require a similar 
approach to demonstrate statistical compliance against the requirements shown in Table 36. 
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Figure 30.  Example of Kriging response surface. 
8.2 MODEL DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 
 Because the ATD models are not validated for spaceflight-like conditions and each spacecraft 
design has unique seat, restraint, and suit configurations, seat-level ATD testing is required to tune and 
calibrate each model component and their subsequent interfacing within the occupant model.  Although 
ATD test case selection is driven from simulated driving crew load cases, some adjustments are made to 
most effectively tune and calibrate the seat, restraint, suit element and ATD model.  Adjustments from 
crew load cases to ATD test cases for model development primarily include simplification to single axis-
loading to extract specific model interaction effects (i.e., pure +Z loading to calibrate ATD pelvis to seat 
interaction and spinal response). 
 
Figure 31.  Model development approach. 
 A sufficient number of ATD tests encompassing selected driving load case conditions are 
required to cover the design space.  Additional load cases are typically required to drive the ATD 
response to sufficiently exercise the kinematic response of the occupant model.  For example rear impact 
conditions may not drive ATD-injury-metric responses, as neck motion in these cases is limited.  
Instead, additional frontal impact testing may be required to calibrate neck kinematics, even if these 
cases fall outside the expected loading conditions.  When planning seat-level ATD testing the following 
criteria must be considered: 
• Test repeatability (multiple tests for each condition) 
• Crew orientation to impact vector 
• Test cases that are sufficient to excite each ATD response near the associated IARV 
• Unsuited cases for ATD model tuning, followed by suited cases to aid development of the 
suit element model 
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• Multiple peak accelerations and rise times to assess model frequency dependence 
• Flight-like seat, suit elements, and restraints must be used 
• Multiple ATD sizes must be tested that drive worst case seat and suit element fit 
 Experience has shown that a more robust seat-level testing campaign is beneficial to reducing the 
MUF associated with each ATD injury-response metric. 
 Initial conditions, including the ATD position in the seat and driving accelerations, measured 
during ATD testing are used to develop and drive occupant-model simulations.  Occupant-model 
response predictions are evaluated against measured ATD and test setup instrumentation (i.e., seat and 
belt load cells) responses.  Observed gross differences are used to initially tune the occupant model.  
After initial tuning, ATD model responses associated with each injury metric should be evaluated with a 
quantitative screening method, such as ISO-TR 16250, to determine acceptability before proceeding to 
assessing MUFs [143].  Because the phase, shape, and magnitude of each response may affect predicted 
ATD IARVs, a minimum signal correlation threshold is required for acceptability.  This threshold 
should be selected based on the vehicle design, IARV margin, and other considerations.  If the 
acceptability threshold is not met, additional model tuning and calibration is required. 
 For each ATD model response that meets the established acceptability threshold, a MUF is 
calculated based on the ratio between the model and test response magnitudes.  The MUF calculated for 
a specific model response may be dependent on load conditions (i.e., G-level, direction of impact, and 
rise time), ATD type (i.e., small female or large male ATD), or suited versus unsuited.  Thus, a 
statistically derived MUF for each model response as a function of these variables is recommended. 
 Using the verified occupant model with defined MUFs, driving load cases are resimulated to 
update the injury-metric-response surfaces and injury-risk heat map with improved results (see Section 
8.1).  Driving crew load cases, now selected with higher model confidence, are used to select full-
vehicle test cases for model validation. 
8.3 MODEL VALIDATION APPROACH 
 To validate the occupant model, full-vehicle testing is needed to replicate the multi-axial loading 
conditions not reproducible in uni-axial sled testing.  The test cases are selected from the updated injury-
metric-response surface.  At least one driving case should be selected to test each ATD IARV risk 
scenario in the full-vehicle test.  In situations where one test case exercises multiple ATD injury metrics, 
it is acceptable to conduct a single test to cover the IARV risk.  These tests must be conducted with 
flight-like initial conditions, seat, suit and restraints and should include all applicable ATD sizes. 
 
Figure 32.  Model validation approach. 
 Upon completion of the full-vehicle testing, the physical ATD responses should be compared to 
simulation predictions made by the verified occupant model developed during the model development 
step and driven by the measured vehicle-seat accelerations.  If the models (with associated MUFs) 
adequately predict the full-vehicle test results, then the model can be considered validated.  If the ATD 
model with MUFs does not adequately predict the physical ATD responses, increased MUFs or 
additional model tuning and calibration may be needed to address the shortcomings.  This model tuning 
may require additional sled testing to verify modeling gaps not previously addressed.  Once the occupant 
model is acceptable and validated, the final ATD-analysis cycle can be conducted to show design 
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compliance.  In addition to the possible updates to the occupant model, updates to the full-vehicle model 
may be made based on the full-scale vehicle testing.  If model improvements are made during the 
validation effort, the resultant full-vehicle model and occupant model is used to develop a final set of 
injury-response surfaces.  The resulting IARV and Brinkley response surfaces are then used to select the 
final bounding crew load cases for vehicle certification. 
8.4 DESIGN COMPLIANCE APPROACH 
 Physical ATD IARV requirement-verification testing, probabilistic design-space analysis, and 
human subject testing are used in combination to ensure the vehicle both meets all occupant protection 
certification requirements, and sources of compliance in error are identified and mitigated. 
 
Figure 33.  Design compliance approach. 
8.4.1 Design Compliance Testing 
 The ATD IARV requirement verification is performed through physical ATD testing of high-risk 
design cases, selected from the injury-risk heat map, at or closest to the vehicle specific probability of 
occurrence boundary.  These cases are chosen with the assumption that they adequately bound the 
injury-risk design space.  This assumption is strengthened through confidence in the computational 
analysis performed with the validated occupant model.  Tests are performed with final vehicle design 
components to show design compliance.  Depending on conditions selected, and confidence in 
transferring the vehicle kinematics to a single-seat environment, ATDs situated in the seat or full vehicle 
testing may be required.  Measured ATD injury response must pass defined IARV metrics to verify the 
design-risk boundary is adequately covered for human spaceflight certification. 
 
Figure 34.  Compliance testing approach. 
8.4.2 Design Compliance Analysis 
 Design compliance analysis is performed to verify the probabilistic vehicle requirements for 
occupant protection.  The vehicle specific nominal and off-nominal injury-risk performance 
requirements are evaluated against the heat map developed for Brinkley and ATD calculated injury risk.  
The heat map is divided into the nominal and off-nominal condition sectors from which the initial 
analysis was derived.  The probability of injury within each sector, as determined from IARV and 
Brinkley limits, is then calculated.  The probability of injury for both nominal and off-nominal cases 
must be below those defined in the injury-risk performance requirements for the vehicle to be human 
certified. 
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Figure 35.  Compliance analysis approach. 
8.4.3 Human Volunteer Testing Requirement Verification 
 All methods for human surrogate testing and analysis have some level of uncertainty associated 
with their validity in providing an accurate prediction of human response.  It is vital to conduct volunteer 
testing at predicted sub-injurious levels for nominal landing conditions before manned flight, to ensure 
no injury mechanisms have been missed in the surrogate-model assumptions.  After all of the required 
testing and analysis have been conducted, a final validation with volunteer subjects conducted on a 
horizontal sled and/or vertical drop tower are required to certify a design.  Because the test protocol will 
be design specific, this section is intended as a general overview of the protocol that must be employed; 
however, details of the specific testing will vary as necessary.  These tests are intended to be NASA-
performed validation testing, as levying such requirements without specific insight into the design could 
be very difficult and burdensome.  Although these tests are intended as a final validation of a design, 
they are critical for assuring the safety of the occupant protection systems.  Without such tests, human 
testing of the system will occur during actual flight operations, where medical assistance and rescue may 
not be immediately available. 
 
Figure 36.  Requirement verification approach. 
8.4.3.1 Safety Review 
 All testing must meet the requirements of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations Title 14, Part 
1230, Protection of Human Subjects, [144].  All test protocols must be reviewed and approved by an 
appropriate Institutional Review Board (IRB) and must pass a facilities readiness review and test 
readiness review per JPR 1700.1, JSC Safety and Health Handbook [145].  The IRB evaluates the risk-
benefit ratio of the testing to determine whether the risk to the human subjects is justified.  All efforts 
must be made to minimize the risk to the humans during testing.  Because of this necessity, only nominal 
landing loads will be tested. 
8.4.3.2 Subject Selection 
 Subjects must be selected such that they represent the complete range of astronaut population for 
the specific vehicle program being evaluated.  Each vehicle may have different astronaut demographics 
depending on the nature of the mission.  For example, a human Mars mission may include only older 
astronauts due to the radiation risks.  Because older occupants may be at a greater risk of injury, an older 
subject population would be required for the volunteer testing.  Another example may be an asteroid 
mission, where all of the crewmembers would be required to perform extravehicular activities (EVA).  
The constraints of the suit would limit the possible anthropometric range for such a mission, so human 
testing may only need to include a subset of the entire astronaut population’s anthropometry. 
 The number of subjects is also critical for determining the appropriate level of confidence.  
Based on the risk acceptance of the Program, the number of subjects may range from 10 (low 
confidence) to 45 subjects (90% confidence that true risk of injury is less than 5%). 
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 In addition to the subject-inclusion criteria stated above, subjects must meet the fitness-for-duty 
standards specified in NASA-STD-3001, Volume I, Space Flight Human-System Standard, Volume 1: 
Crew Health [110].  Several exclusion criteria will also be applied to the subject selection process.  The 
following exclusion criteria (Table 37) are imposed as an additional level of safety for the subject as well 
as to ensure the subject population is similar to the Astronaut Corps. 
TABLE 37.  SAMPLE SUBJECT EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
Subject Exclusion Criteria 
Clinically Significant Musculoskeletal Injury  
Clinically Significant Degenerative Spinal Condition 
Clinically Significant Osteopenia 
8.4.3.3 Test Equipment 
 Testing must consist of all applicable human interfaces including the seat, footrest, restraints, and 
suit in a flight- or flight-like configuration.  In cases where other internal cabin structures are nearby and 
may interact with the human, they also must be simulated in the testing. 
8.4.3.4 Test Protocol 
 All tests must be conducted based on verified landing loads analysis and test data.  Ideally, tests 
of the maximum nominal loads allowed by the IRB would be desired; however, depending on the 
particular configuration and landing loads, other loads may be chosen for testing.  All possible nominal-
landing-load orientations should be considered for testing, but may be constrained due to the total 
number of tests.  Whichever test cases are chosen, testing must begin at low levels and proceed up to the 
nominal load.  The number of increments will be dependent on the nominal loads and the requirements 
imposed by the IRB to ensure subject safety.  Each step to the next higher loading will only be allowed 
with medical monitor approval. 
8.4.3.5 Data Collection 
 Sled and seat accelerometers to verify sled acceleration peak, rise time, and pulse duration are 
appropriate for comparison to expected landing loads.  Discomfort scale questionnaires must be 
completed before and after testing.  In addition, chest, head, and T1 acceleration should be collected to 
assess occupant kinematics and dynamics. 
8.4.3.6 Acceptance Criteria 
 Based on a medical assessment of each subject post-test, no injuries occur during any test.  A 
sample decision tree for determining an injury is shown in Figure 37, with definitions given in Table 38. 
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Figure 37.  Example injury determination process. 
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TABLE 38.  EXAMPLE DEFINITION OF ACCEPTABLE INJURIES 
AIS=1, Acceptable Injury 
Headache 
Abrasion 
Minor Superficial Laceration 
Superficial Avulsion  
Minor Superficial Penetration Injury 
Hematoma 
Dizzy 
Tinnitus 
Minor Musculoskeletal Strain 
8.5 ADVERSE OUTCOMES 
 Any adverse outcome must be reported to the appropriate IRB before continuing any testing.  
Major injuries must be reported and approval to resume tests must be obtained before further tests can be 
conducted.  A sample decision tree is shown in Figure 38.  Adverse outcomes must be included in the 
final testing report. 
 
Figure 38.  Sample decision tree for continuing testing after an adverse event. 
9.0 FORWARD WORK 
 Although the revised requirements proposed in this document mitigate the risk of injury to 
crewmembers, there are still considerable limitations to this approach. 
 First, the BDRC as used today has several limitations for NASA’s use.  The +X axis model was 
developed with limited data in regard to the model parameters and the injury risk limits.  Because this is 
expected to be the primary landing load direction, additional work is needed to either revise the model 
and injury limits, or use more recent developments in the automotive and military injury biomechanics 
fields to replace the model.  The Y axis model has similar limitations.  Very few data were used to 
develop the model and determine the injury levels.  Given this limited amount of data, the model would 
likely not have a high CAS score per NASA-STD-7009A [141].  Although each program or Technical 
Authority must define the acceptable CAS for a given model, it is anticipated that the decision 
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consequence for the BDRC would be either a Class I (Catastrophic) or a Class II (Critical), and the 
results influence would be a 5 (controlling), requiring the model be evaluated using the standard.  This 
work should be conducted to assign a CAS to the BDRC. 
 As discussed previously, sex differences are of concern because the model was developed with 
primarily male subjects.  Even with the supplemental ATD tests specified, there remains some 
uncertainty that the proposed requirements offer the appropriate level of protection for returning 
crewmembers.  Age and anthropometry are also areas of further investigation needed to understand how 
these factors relate to the risk of injury in the orientations expected for future vehicles. 
 While the Hybrid III Automotive ATD is widely used and readily available and high-fidelity 
numerical models are available, there are limitations associated with its design.  Most notably, the 
Hybrid III is not intended for lateral testing.  Even though the neck is capable of measuring lateral 
bending moments, it is not biofidelic.  In addition, the chest was designed primarily for steering wheel 
hub interaction and is very stiff compared to humans. 
 Finally deconditioning due to long-duration spaceflight is a unique challenge that is not directly 
addressed by any of the methods described here.  Because spaceflight deconditioning has the potential to 
reduce impact tolerance significantly, this area requires further study.  In addition, current on-orbit 
countermeasures have shown promise for mitigating the effects of deconditioning in other areas, so 
further investigation of the effect on injury biomechanics is needed. 
 Given sufficient research in these areas, volunteer testing may not be required in the future, 
which would be a significant benefit to the vehicle programs. 
10.0 CONCLUSION 
 Given the current state of knowledge in the injury biomechanics field, the requirements set out in 
this document are the best attempt to reduce the risk of injury to future NASA crewmembers.  Although 
not all of the risk is mitigated as discussed above, these requirements represent the best available 
requirements for protection of crewmembers in future vehicles and at the same time are achievable by 
spacecraft designers. 
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APPENDIX A -  SUMMARY OF OCCUPANT PROTECTION IMPACT TESTS 
CONDUCTED TO SUPPORT JOINT USAF AND NASA SPACECRAFT 
LANDING STUDIES 
Addressing Complex Multi-directional Accelerations 
 Based upon survived accidents, experimental data from tests with volunteers, tests with animals 
[17], and theoretical work based on the laws of mechanics, AFRL laid out an initial plan to investigate 
the acceleration profiles with high rates of onset using experimental and analytical approaches.  NASA 
joined this effort to investigate human tolerance to landing impact conditions with rates of onset higher 
than had previously been considered safe. 
 To begin to address this problem, Headley et al. [15, 16] and Brinkley et al. [18, 19] conducted 
experiments with volunteer subjects to explore the human responses to the complex waveforms 
associated with emergency escape capsule impact and the Project Mercury module launch abort 
landing impact.  These experimental data demonstrated several relationships between the higher rates 
of acceleration onset, acceleration magnitude, and impact velocity change in the +Z- and +X-axes.  
During these experiments, Brinkley et al. [18] investigated the beneficial effects of an individually 
contoured body support constructed of fiberglass compared to a body support liner filled with plastic 
microballoons that could be formed to fit the occupant (Figure 39).  Preliminary tests using dummies 
explored the safety of these body support and restraint systems.  These tests included a net couch that 
had been demonstrated to be especially effective in protecting volunteers to sustained acceleration 
levels up to 16 G.  The net couch proved to be unacceptable during impact tests.  The elasticity of the 
couch caused amplification of the impact loads. 
 The individually contoured couch and the form-fitted liner proved equally effective in 
protecting the volunteers during impact tests [18].  Thirty-two impact tests were completed with 
volunteers at the time of Brinkley’s report.  The couches were designed to hold the subject’s body in a 
semi-supine posture and were mounted on top of a wooden heat shield structure.  The subject’s 
unhelmeted head and torso were inclined at 12° from horizontal.  The restraint system is shown in 
Figure 39.  Dropping the test vehicle on compacted sand created the impact acceleration of the heat 
shield structure with vertical impact velocities ranging from 10 to 30 ft/s.  The impact of the couches 
was attenuated by 8 inches of highly crushable aluminum honeycomb mounted under the couch.  The 
impact accelerations were increased in increments up to a maximum of 36.5 G with rates of onset up to 
11,200 G/s.  Accelerations were measured on the subject’s chest and forehead as well as on the couch 
and wooden heat shield.  The highest acceleration measured on the subject was 54.5 G.  There were no 
injuries reported as a result of these experiments.  A few of the volunteers experienced brief headaches 
soon after the tests. 
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Figure 39.  Photographs of a volunteer subject prepared for an impact test supported by couch 
with a form-fitting liner and a top view of the liner formed to fit the test subject.  (Credit: USAF) 
 During this same period, Payne [20] used the extensive human and animal impact exposure 
data assembled by Eiband [12], and Goldman and von Gierke [21] to study the feasibility of 
developing simple, lumped-parameter dynamic models that might describe more adequately the human 
response and likelihood of injury based on the experimental data.  Payne developed numerical models 
of restraint and support systems to show the effects of their mechanical properties on the human 
responses to complex acceleration profiles. 
 In 1962, NASA began to organize efforts to design the Apollo crew systems.  One of the efforts 
included the development of a crew module landing impact system human tolerance criteria. Initially, 
crew protection system designers were forced to accept a maximum acceleration of 10 G and a rate of 
onset of 250 G/s as the limiting crew acceleration exposure criteria.  A major analytical and 
experimental program was organized by the NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (later renamed the 
Johnson Space Center [JSC]) and was implemented by AFRL, the Naval Air Engineering Center, and 
the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology to identify potential critical modes of injury and likely adverse 
physiological responses, and to explore the effects of higher level multi-directional impacts “to assure 
astronaut functionality immediately after landing” [146]. 
 The most immediate problem was to explore the human responses to sideward (Y-axis) impact.  
At that time, knowledge of human response to sideward acceleration was limited to the results of 
centrifuge experiments conducted by AFRL at sustained acceleration levels up to 10 G [147].  In a 
study using a centrifuge, Hershgold examined the displacement of the volunteer subjects’ internal 
organs during steady-state acceleration.  His radiographs showed extensive displacement of thoracic 
and abdominal viscera to the dependent side of the body under sustained accelerations as small as 6 G.  
This finding differed from previous studies by Stapp [148], in which he did not observe injuries to 
chimpanzees at calculated accelerations to 47 G with durations estimated to be 140 ms at the peak G 
level. 
 During this same time, impact tests of the B-58 encapsulated ejection seat were conducted with 
volunteer subjects by Holcomb [14].  The capsule was dropped with vertical velocities to 27 ft/s.  The 
capsule landed on its back bulkhead with its occupant in a semi-supine position.  The tests were 
conducted without detectable injury.  During tests not reported in this article, the capsule was impacted 
with horizontal velocities to 34 ft/s.  An undetermined amount of energy was dissipated in tumbling 
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and skidding of the capsule, making use and extrapolation of these data difficult.  However, these tests 
demonstrated the tolerance to sideward impact was probably higher than the 10 G that had been 
investigated under steady-state acceleration of 10 G by Hershgold [147]. 
 In preparation for a joint agreement with NASA to study the feasibility of higher impact 
exposure limits, Robinson et al. [149] conducted impact tests with Rhesus monkeys with sideward 
impacts to 75 G at terminal velocities to 32 ft/s, with and without contoured body support systems.  No 
post-mortem injuries were observed.  Electrocardiographic evidence of transient abnormalities in 
conduction and rhythm were found following higher-level accelerations and impact velocities.  
Radiographs taken before and after the impacts showed an increase in the total heart shadow on the 
dependent side of the midline.  Sequential radiographs revealed that the heart returned to normal within 
3 hours after impact. 
 Under the agreement between NASA and the DoD, Schulman et al. [27], explored the effects of 
downward acceleration (−Z-axis) to 18.5 G with rates of onset to 1,540 G/s.  This research 
supplemented and extended USAF research that had been conducted with animals and volunteers to 
define criteria for downward ejection seats [10]. 
 AFRL conducted impact tests to investigate the dynamic responses of military volunteers using 
a vertical deceleration tower.  Acceleration, forces, physiological reactions, and subjective responses of 
volunteers were measured for sideward (Y-axis) impacts ranging to 21.5 G with rates of onset to 1,350 
G/s and impact velocities to 25.5 ft/s [64].  An individually fitted, semi-rigid body support was used 
with torso and extremity restraints.  The subjects in these tests wore a Mercury pressure-suit helmet 
weighing 2.7 kg.  Plastic foam (0.5-inch thick pads were placed behind the helmet earphones and 
across the chin bar.  The helmet was prevented from pitching motion, but not vertical motion by a 
1.75-inch strap.  The helmet microphone was removed.  The impacts were tolerated by the male 
volunteer subjects. 
 A second series of impact tests jointly sponsored by the USAF and NASA were conducted to 
study the effects of seven impact vector directions and six acceleration profiles ranging in acceleration 
from 3 to 26 G, impact velocities ranging from 5 to 28 ft/s, and onsets ranging from 200 to 2,000 G/s.  
The seven seat orientations including forward, upward, and sideward (right and left) acceleration 
components in 45-degree increments were used on a vertical deceleration tower.  A drawing of the 
orientations, designated as vectors A through G, is shown in Figure 40 [26].  Force, acceleration, and 
physiological data were collected and analyzed.  The volunteers were contained by an experimental 
restraint system and supported by a flat seat and seat back, and side panels to support the pressure-suit 
helmet, shoulders, and upper legs.  The previously used liner filled with small beads was not used in 
this second series of tests.  The subjects needed assistance to ensure that the liner was adequately 
formed about their bodies and they were more confident in the support provided by a rigid seat.  A test 
subject is shown restrained within the multi-directional impact test vehicle in Figure 41.  The seat and 
its frame are attached to the AFRL vertical deceleration tower by rods that are instrumented with force 
measurement cells (see Figure 41).  The restraint system is shown in Figure 42. 
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Figure 40.  Acceleration vectors [26]. 
 
Figure 41.  Multi-directional impact vehicle showing seat and volunteer subject.  
(Credit: USAF) 
 71 
 
Figure 42.  Restraint system configuration [26]. 
 The subject panel included 20 male USAF subjects.  The acceleration and force data were 
subjected to extensive mathematical analysis based upon the Fourier Transformation [150].  The 
relationship between the measured forces and impact velocity, called mechanical impedance, was used 
to identify the human body DR properties in terms of resonances similar to those of linear, second-
order, spring-mass-damper systems.  Broad, low-amplitude resonances were identified at 3.5, 5.5, 7.2, 
and 11.7 Hz.  There was no gross distinction in the impedance magnitude or phase angle among the 
orientations studied.  The subject impedance magnitude increased linearly with frequency to about 35 
Hz.  The analysis was not valid beyond this frequency because the velocity pulse did not contain 
significant frequency components beyond 35 Hz.  Physiologic and subjective response data that were 
collected indicated abrupt cardiac rhythm changes at the higher acceleration levels, wind knocked out, 
and various sites of transient pain including the head.  The investigators concluded the head would 
present a problem at higher impact levels.  However, no voluntary tolerance limit was specified [26]. 
 The USAF accomplished further tests as part of its joint effort with NASA using a horizontal 
deceleration track at Holloman AFB, New Mexico. Stapp and Taylor [28] explored 16 different seat 
orientations with 58 male volunteers ranging in age from 18 to 42 years old, 165.1 to 190.5 cm in 
height, and 52.2 to 94.8 kg in weight.  A total of 146 tests were conducted to explore the effects of 
accelerations ranging in magnitude from 10 to 25 G, rates of onset from 1,000 to 2,000 G/s, and 
durations from 60 to 130 ms.  A pneumatic piston accelerated a sled and subject, allowing it to coast 
and impact a water-filled decelerator at velocities ranging from 18 to 46 ft/s.  The subjects wore 
Mercury pressure-suit helmets and were restrained by the same developmental restraint system used by 
[26] at AFRL.  The seat was constructed of flat panels to support and constrain the subject’s movement 
in the rearward and sideward directions [28] (see Figures 43-44).  For smaller subjects, panels were 
used to ensure that there were no gaps between the subject and the seat. 
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Figure 43.  Seat and Restraint System [29]. 
 
Figure 44.  Photograph of horizontal deceleration test facility and subject restrained within the 
multi-directional test apparatus.  (Credit: USAF) 
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 All body positions and impact conditions were tolerated without injury except the forward-
facing 45-degree reclining position at 25.4-G sled acceleration with a rate of onset of 960 G/s and 97-
ms duration.  The subject experienced soft tissue pain and stiffness in the area of the 6th through 8th 
thoracic vertebrae for 60 days.  Bradycardia was experienced in 55 electrocardiograms immediately 
after impact.  The bradycardia was triggered by headward impact vectors due to stimulation of the 
carotid sinuses, dropping the heart rate as much as 90 beats per minute for 10 to 30 seconds.  The 
restraint looseness was found to be a contributing factor.  Persistent or severe pain was absent in 146 of 
163 tests. 
 Brown et al. [29] extended the research of Weis et al.[26], and Stapp and Taylor [28] by 
conducting 288 impact tests with 79 young adult male volunteers (18 to 42-years old, 167.6 to 190.5 
cm height, and 52.6 to 95.0 kg weight) using the horizontal deceleration track to explore the responses 
of the nervous, cardiovascular, respiratory, and musculoskeletal systems.  Twenty-four acceleration 
vector directions in 45-degree increments were studied (see Figure 45) using the same helmet, body 
support, and restraint in the two studies described above.  Seventy-nine subjects participated in this 
experimental study.  At each seat orientation, the impact level was increased in increments of 2 to 5 G 
until the occurrence of an adverse reaction based upon the evaluation of the subjective, clinical, and 
physiological responses by the medical monitor, determined the maximum impact levels.  Two tests 
were accomplished at each combination of position, acceleration level, and onset rate.  The sled 
acceleration ranged from 5.5 to 30.7 G, the rate of onset was varied from 300 to 2,500 G/s, and the 
impact velocity ranged from 9.3 to 45 ft/s.  The highest impact levels were achieved in positions 19 
and 23, whereas lower levels were limited to 11.8 and 11.1 in positions 9 and 13, respectively.  The 
+Z- and -Z-axes orientations of positions 9 and 13 had been explored more thoroughly in the earlier 
tests by Schulman et al. [27], Weis et al. [26], and Stapp and Taylor [28]. 
 
Figure 45.  Force vectors orientation applied to the volunteers [29]. 
 The neurological effects observed were momentary stunning and disorientation, which lasted 
no more than 2 minutes.  In one case, this response was noted at an impact level as low as 17.4 G, 
where the impact force vector was in orientation 17.  Headaches lasting several hours were noted in 
nine tests.  Shortness of breath and chest pain was experienced by the subjects in more than one-half of 
the higher-level tests.  Musculoskeletal complaints resulted primarily from muscle spasms and strains 
of the neck, back, and lower extremities.
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APPENDIX B -  NASA SIGN CONVENTION 
 The coordinate system used by NASA is shown in Figure 46 as given in the NASA/SP-2010-
3407, NASA Human Integration Design Handbook, [151].  To be consistent with the original 
derivation of the Brinkley Dynamic Response Criterion (BDRC), this report uses the ±X, ±Y, ±Z 
nomenclature (acting acceleration) instead of the ±Gx, ±Gy, and ±Gz nomenclature (inertial responses) 
used in the NASA Standard (Figure 47). 
 
Figure 46.  Acting Acceleration Directions 
 
Figure 47.  Inertial Responses 
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APPENDIX C -  ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACRV Assured Crew Return Vehicle 
AFB Air Force Base 
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 
AIS Abbreviated Injury Scale 
ATD Anthropomorphic Test Device 
BDRC Brinkley Dynamic Response Criterion 
BMD bone mineral density 
CAS credibility assessment scale 
CBDN Collaborative Biodynamics Network 
CE compression-extension 
CF compression-flexion 
CL compression-lateral 
DAI diffuse axonal injury 
DoD Department of Defense 
DOF degree-of-freedom 
DR dynamic response 
DRI Dynamic Response Index 
EVA Extravehicular Activity 
FE Finite Element 
GSI Gadd Severity Index 
HIC Head Injury Criteria 
HSIR Human-System Integration Requirements 
Hz Hertz 
IARV injury assessment reference values 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
IRC Injury Risk Criterion 
ISS International Space Station 
lbf Pounds (force) 
JSC Johnson Space Center 
JSF Joint Strike Fighter 
MTBI mild traumatic brain injury 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
TE tension-extension 
TF tension-flexion 
TL tension-lateral 
USAF United States Air Force 
WSTC Wayne State Tolerance Curve 
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APPENDIX D -  DOCUMENTATION 
JPR 1700.1 JSC Safety and Health Handbook 
MIL-S-58095A Military Specification Seat System: Crash-Resistant, Non-
Ejection, Aircrew General Specification 
MIL-S-9479B Military Specification Seat System, Upward Ejection, Aircraft, 
General Specification 
NASA/SP-2010-3407 NASA Human Integration Design Handbook 
NASA-STD-3001, Volume I Space Flight Human-System Standard, Volume 1: Crew Health 
NASA-STD-3001, Volume II Space Flight Human-System Standard Volume 2: Human 
Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health 
NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document for Human Health and Performance Models 
and Simulations 
NHTSA FMVSS 208 Occupant Crash Protection 
SAE AS-8043B Restraint Systems for Civil Aircraft 
SFI Specification 16.1 Driver Restraint Assemblies 
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 
Title 14, Part 1230 
Protection of Human Subjects 
 
